

lar legislation where outright opposition to the legislation would be politically dangerous.

6. A bicameral legislature prevents unity in the legislature and so precludes the success of any legislative attempts to invade the powers of the executive or judicial branches or the powers of the people.
7. A bicameral system prevents corruption of the legislature. Corruption of a single chamber might succeed, but it would be much more difficult to corrupt both houses at the same time.
8. The bicameral system is traditional in the United States and familiar to voters.

The foregoing arguments are assumed by proponents of bicameralism to be self-apparent. Research studies documenting these claims are not available.

In addition to these direct arguments for a bicameral system, proponents of bicameralism attack certain features of the unicameral system. Generally, these attacks take the form of an assertion that the unicameral system lacks some desirable features found in the bicameral system, in particular, checks on popular passions and an independent review. The specific features of the unicameral system are not attacked as undesirable in themselves.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE UNICAMERAL SYSTEM

The case for unicameralism rests on three grounds: (1) an assertion that there is no justification for the present bicameral system, (2) a positive plea for the merits of unicameralism, and (3) a refutation of the asserted deficiencies of unicameralism.

THE ATTACK ON BICAMERALISM

As noted earlier, justification for a second chamber is no longer claimed on grounds that the upper chamber protects propertied classes or permits representation of different interests in the society. It should be noted in passing, though, that historically these were the two fundamental justifications advanced for the bicameral system. With their demise, justification of bicameralism has had to fall back to secondary arguments which unicameralists claim to be untenable.

The claim that bicameralism provides a check on "popular passions" and on hastily drawn legislation is vigorously attacked by unicameralists. One aspect of the attack involves basic differences in the judgment of the proper role of the legislature. Thus unicameralists assert that a check on legislative action, purely for the sake of blocking action disliked by the minority, is undemocratic, and one of the prime causes for the widely recognized decline of legislative power vis-à-vis the executive. Further, state the unicameralists, the claimed need for a review is a tacit recognition of the inherently faulty nature of the bicameral system with its confusion of responsibilities that permits legislators to escape public accountability for their actions. If the legislature were properly structured, there would be little need for a review of its work. On the practical side, the unicameralists assert that the so-called popular passion can dominate both chambers, as it did in some legislatures during the McCarthy era. In this view, protecting rights of unpopular groups resides basically in an educated citizenry and in the overall structure of the constitutional system. Furthermore, the branch of government that has raised its voice against popular views in defense of minorities has not been the legislature, but the courts. Simply put, no data