faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils, and
modified by mutual interests.
    However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular
ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning,
ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for
themselves the reigns of government; destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them
to unjust dominion.
    Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state,
it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged
authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles however
specious the pretexts.--One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations
which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly
overthrown.  In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at
least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions--that experience
is the surest standard, by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a
country--that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to a perpetual
change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that
for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government
of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty, is indispensible.  Liberty
itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest
guardian.  It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand
the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the
laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.
    I have already intimated to you, the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to
the founding of them on geographical discriminations.  Let me now take a more comprehensive
view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party,
generally.
    This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions
of the human mind.--It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled,
or repressed; but in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly
their worst enemy.
    The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural
to party dissention, which in different ages and countries has perpetuated the most horrid enormities,
is itself a frightful despotism.--But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.--
The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and
repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction
more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own
elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.
    Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely
out of sight) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it
the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.
    It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration.  It agitates
the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against
another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection.  It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption,
which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions.
Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.
    There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the
government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty.  This within certain limits is probably
true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with
favour upon the spirit of the party.  But in those of the popular character, in governments purely
elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged.  From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always
be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose.  And there being a constant danger of excess,
the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.  A fire not to be
quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its burning into a flame, left, instead of
warming it should consume.
    It is important likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country, should inspire caution, in
those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional
spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another.  The
spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to
create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.  A just estimate of that love of power,
and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the
truth of this position.  The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power; by
dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and construing each of guardian of the public
weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some
of them in our country and under our own eyes.  To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute
them.  If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional
powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the constitution
designates.--But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance,
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.