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My only answer to you on that is that
our intent is the effective separation of
church and state. If you are asking me
whether or not it is our intention, our
intention is established in the Horace Mann
case.
Now, if you are asking me whether or
not at a future time this would be changed,
if the Court of Appeals reversed itself and
did something else what would be the
status, I cannot answer.
I can only tell you our intention was to
establish a separation of church and state
based upon what the present status of the
law is in Maryland as enunciated by the
Horace Mann case.
Now, I do not know whether that helps
you or does not, but I am not going to try
to conjecture as to what is going to happen
in the future.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: I am afraid
that does not help very much.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: During the
debates of the Committee on this subject,
was it not the intent of the Committee to
freeze Horace Mann into the law of Mary-
land?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: When you say
was it the intention to freeze Horace Mann,
it was the intention to freeze the concept
set forth in the Horace Mann case, exactly.
Now, when you ask me was it the in-
tention to freeze the specific facts, as such,
I do not know whether it was or not, but
the basic concept set forth, yes.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: And should
the same fact situation, which we all recog-
nize is impossible, but should the same fact
situation arise and the Supreme Court hold
that what the Maryland Court of Appeals
held was unconstitutional, the Maryland
rule would therefore be more restrictive, is
that not the case?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: It would be
more restrictive unless the Maryland Court
of Appeals again reversed itself, yes.
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DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: If the Mary-
land Court of Appeals reversed itself, it
would be going against the intent of the
Committee, is that not correct?
It would be the intent of the Committee
that Horace Mann should not be reversed
by the Court of Appeals?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: I cannot answer
specifically other than to say that we ac-
cepted the tenets of the Horace Mann case,
and I am not willing to say that if the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
reversed itself unequivocally on this par-
ticular set of facts that we as a Com-
mittee would feel that we had been wrong.
What I am saying is that Ave, as a Com-
mittee, adopted the guidelines and the prin-
ciples of the Horace Mann case.
Now, I am sorry if you feel that I am
equivocating. When I say we froze the
Horace Mann case into our concept, we
used the Horace Mann case and its con-
cepts of the law, yes. We were not so
much concerned about the particular, pecu-
liar set of facts as such as we were about
the broad principles of avoiding any secular
or sectarian involvement by the State.
When we get to specific instances, I
have no answer. That is up to the individ-
ual courts.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Mentzer.
DELEGATE MENTZER: Chairman
Kiefer, was there any feeling on the part
of your Committee that if and when the
Supreme Court faces squarely cases raising
the problem of public money to aid paro-
chial schools that they will probably hold
that the "no establishment clause" will not
bar the states from assisting such stu-
dents en some version of the pupil benefit
theory even though the pupil benefit might
work indirectly to aid the schools them-
selves?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: I am not sure I
understand your question.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Could you put the question in a different
way?
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