|
DELEGATE MENTZER: As I under-
stand it, the issues of public support going
'to church schools has really not been
faced clearly by the Supreme Court, but
some people feel that when it is, probably
such aid would be authorized on the pupil
benefit theory, even though others feel
that the pupil benefit theory would then
be aiding schools themselves.
I wondered whether your Committee had
looked ahead to that or had a feeling about
how the rulings might go in the future.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: We talked about
all aspects of this as far as we could. We
have not tried to undertake what the
future might hold. What we did try to
establish — which I could not get across ap-
parently to Delegate Willoner or to some
of the other questioners — was that we in-
tended to freeze into the meaning of this
section the law as stated in the Horace
Mann case, but without regard to a spe-
cific set of facts, because facts vary from
case to case.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Mentzer.
DELEGATE MENTZER: Was the pupil
benefit theory involved in the Horace Mann
case?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: No.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Johnson.
DELEGATE JOHNSON: Chairman
Kiefer, with respect to your little First
Amendment as provided in section 2, free-
dom of religion, would you have any objec-
tion if I provided my own interpretation
of that?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Be my guest.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Johnson.
DELEGATE JOHNSON: Would it be
fair to suggest that you would recommend
this to the rest of the Committee of the
Whole?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Recommend
what?
|
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Johnson.
DELEGATE JOHNSON: Chairman Kie-
fer, do you mean to lock the Committee of
the Whole in and lock this Constitution
or this Convention into the various in-
terpretations that may or may not have
been given to this freedom of religious
clause? Is it not best we all interpret it
in our own way and vote accordingly?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: That is a good
concept except, Delegate Johnson, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has in a
number of instances ruled as to specific
situations.
It has not completely and I suppose
never completely fill in every one of the
possible pieces of the mosaic that could go
into this picture.
I am not trying to dodge the issue when
I say that we cannot guess what it might
be, but I think that, as you say, each per-
son has to conceive what they think it
might mean. All I can say it was the
intent of the Committee to freeze into our
Constitution the legal concepts of the Hor-
ace Mann case, and any fact that may be
related to it that follows through would
normally follow.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
The Chair recognizes Delegate Henderson.
DELEGATE HENDERSON: I hate to
prolong this discussion, but perhaps this
question will clear something up.
Is it not the case — and I don't know
whether it is or not — that the Court of
Appeals in reaching that decision in the
Mann case was putting a construction on
the federal Constitution. It did not base it
on the Maryland Constitution, did it?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: You are correct,
it did not base it on the Maryland Consti-
tution, and in fact said the Maryland Con-
stitution would have held these grants
valid.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Henderson.
DELEGATE HENDERSON: Therefore
it was following the interpretation placed
upon the Sixth Amendment of the federal
Constitution by the Supreme Court, and
only the Supreme Court is the authoritative
|
