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DELEGATE MACDONALD: Is that
true regardless of varying interpretations
of the Court in the future?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: We based this
language — I will try again to make it
clear, and I do not want to be cute with
you. We based the language that we have
stated in section 2 on what our Court of
Appeals has said in the Horace Mann case
and what the Supreme Court said in the
Everson case. This is the only basis on
which we can tell you why we used the
language of the First Amendment.
Now, in the Everson case — and I will
take again a moment to read you that
famous language which I think establishes
this concept:
"The establishment of religion clause
of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the federal gov-
ernment can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any re-
ligion. No person can be punished for en-
tertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the
federal government can openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups, and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect a wall of separa-
tion between church and state."
Now, our court applied this language in
construing four separate grants by the
legislature to four separate institutions of
higher learning and held in the case of
three of them that this was an aid of sec-
tarian schools and therefore unconstitu-
tional.
Now, the reason we adopted the First
Amendment language was that the Court
went on in this very case to say that under
the Maryland Declaration of Rights it
would not be unconstitutional and had
been done for years and had been the prac-
tice over the last 100 or 200 yop.rs.
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I hope that I have made clear to you
that our language is based upon the pres-
ent status of the law as clearly established
by the Supreme Court and by our own
Court of Appeals, and I cannot be any
more definite.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald, were you finished?
DELEGATE MACDONALD: I under-
stand that this represents the intent of
your Committee, is that correct?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: That is correct,
and is so stated, I think, in our memo-
randum.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: The question
Delegate Macdonald was trying to put to
you was the following, Mr. Kiefer, and I
will put it.
Suppose Maryland adopts the proposal
as you have it in the First Amendment
almost in hoc verba with the First Amend-
ment, and a few years hence the Supreme
Court of the United States holds that it is
not a violation of the First Amendment
for a State to make matching contributions
to institutions of higher education which
may have religious affiliations, when the
matching grant is made in connection with
the construction of laboratories, classrooms,
and other non-religious facilities.
Assume the Supreme Court so holds in
the future. Is it the intention of your
Committee to permit that interpretation of
the Supreme Court to be the interpretation
which would control the Maryland courts
for purposes of applying their own little
First Amendment, or would it be the in-
tention of your Committee to freeze the
decision, the result reached in the Horace
Mann case in the constitution of the State,
assuming the adoption of a little First
Amendment?
Do I make myself clear?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Well, you make
yourself clear.
We had testimony on this from Mr.
William Marbury, who was one of the coun-
sel in one of these cases, and, of course, I
think you know oomething ;^bout these
cases, too.
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