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a lot of additional language in the Con-
stitution.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: Delegate
Kiefer, I had understood that in answer to
my questions you had stated that it was
the intent of the Committee in adoping
section 2 in its present form to adopt the
rationale and the decision of the majority
in the Horace Mann case.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: That is correct.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: As a result
of the questions posed to you by Delegates
Gallagher and Hardwicke, am I correct or
incorrect in understanding that your intent
in inserting this provision is flexible ?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: No, that is not
correct. You misunderstood, or I did not
make myself clear, Delegate Macdonald.
The Committee's position was unequivo-
cally in favor of the effective separation of
church and state. Now, we recognize that
there are, of course, certain basic limita-
tions on this. In other words, no one would
quarrel about a fire engine coming to put
out a fire at a church, or a policeman direct-
ing traffic in front of a church, or somebody
aiding in connection with an emergency of
some sort.
We also frankly realize that it would be
completely unconstitutional, improper and
illegal for the State to contribute money to
a sectarian school, as has been established.
What we have said is that we are in
favor of, as a Committee, unanimously, the
separation of church and state.
We have agreed 16 to 1 that the most
effective way to state this is the First
Amendment language, because we have a
specific ruling by the Court of Appeals in
the Horace Mann case which unequivocally
states the separation of church and state.
Now, where I think I may have misled
you is when I said I do not know what a
future court would do. I simply don't know
if the Supreme Court held in the same set
of circumstances that this would be a valid
grant, any one of these statutes, whether
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or not the Court of Appeals would hold to
that.
What we are saying to this Convention
is that our intention was to state as un-
equivocally as we could the separation of
church and state, and we think we have
done it.
If you will refer to the Horace Mann lan-
guage, and I will read you some of it, if
you want, I have it right here, it in effect
states the very things which I think may
have worried you in connection with the
question of contributing tax money to the
support of sectarian schools.
If I might read it to you: "After con-
sideration of all the Supreme Court de-
cisions and our statement of their rationale
quoted above, we have reached the con-
clusion that insofar as the issue of the
First Amendment is concerned we should
apply the following standards in meas-
uring the statutes under consideration."
Then they go on to list a number of
these.
"A State cannot contribute tax-raised
funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church."
Then it quotes the exact language of the
Everson case that I quoted to you yester-
day afternoon.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: Do I
understand, so we have this clear, that
this is the intent of your Committee in
suggesting section 2 in its present form?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Yes, sir.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: Do I
understand now that that intent is firm
and meant to be permanent, that this is
what you intend as long as this section is
in its present form?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: This was our in-
tent, yes.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald.
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