marked the sudden transfer of power in most
parts of the world. Grant then, gentlemen of
the small counties, to the majority this protec-
tion, and they will, in all likelihood, rest satis-
fied, at least for a long time—deny it to them,
and you provide effectually for a speedy renewal
of that agitation which you so much deprecate
and which will not again subside until it has over-
turned what you consider the bulwarks of your
safety. By according this boon, you bestow no
means of inflicting injury on yourselves, but only
a talisman which will disarm those whom you
fear and render them your friends.
I have now disposed, Mr. President, of one
of the main causes of that lamentable sectional
prejudice, which so unfortunately arrays the different
portions of our State each against the
other. I have sought to trace it to its source,
and to point out a remedy effectual, while harm-
less. and not less beneficial than efficacious. In
support of these assertions. I will now proceed to
consider another important cause of those local
animosities which distract our little common-
wealth, and which have been so unpleasantly ex-
hibited upon this floor.
Maryland has indulged to great excess in partial,
special and local legislation. Her govern-
ment has transcended its proper functions; and
assuming a degree of power which should never
be exercised by mere agents, has interfered from
time to time in enterprises and speculations,
which in a free government, are properly left to
individual action and voluntary combination.—
We have, it is true. already stripped the Legis-
lature of several of those powers through which
it has heretofore operated injuriously to certain
interests and sections of the State for the benefit
of other localities and interests. And, sir, I will
here take occasion to say, that I should have
been happy to have seen our government made
one of merely enumerated and strictly defined
powers, even as in this respect, our general government
is limited and restricted. I believe that
this object could readily be accomplished, and
that it would be attended with very great bene-
fit to our beloved State. But the restrictions we
have already imposed on the Legislature, those
which we hereafter superadd, will tend very
much to diminish the evil which I am now considering.
Fortify these restrictions by a sus-
pensive veto in the Executive, and you will
lessen very much the danger, not only of usur-
pation by the general Assembly of those powers,
expressly with-held, but also of the assumption
by it of powers heretofore dormant, which may
be hereafter called into life, by the ingenuity
and ambition of faithless or misguided public
servants.
If you will still go further than you have
done in restricting the legislative power; if you
will no longer permit it to include the right of
special, partial, and local enactments, creating
as these unavoidably do, sectional pressures and
antagonisms; if you will interpose the check
whose adoption I am urging on you, to prevent, the
exercise by the Assembly of prohibited powers,
you will not only take efficient steps towards ex-
40 |
tinguishing sectional jealousies, but will, in a
gnat degree abrogate the practical importance
of the apportionment of representation. Were
there left to the Assembly but those powers
which could be exerted only for the general
benefit and equal advantage of all portions, and
as nearly as might be, of every individual, the
members of your Legislature would, by necessi-
ty, become the representatives not of their re-
spective counties or cities, but of the whole State.
Then the distribution of these representatives
would become a question of comparatively tri-
fling moment; and the restraint upon their tend-
ency to exercise authority not entrusted to them,
imposed by the supervision of a Governor elect-
ed by the whole people, would afford as much as
practicable of that security against abuses, which
is the grand problem to be solved in the forma-
tion of government.
Besides, (as was most lucidly expounded by
General Hamilton, in the article in the Federalist
from which I have quoted,) by means of the
veto power, we can in another way do much to.
wards softening and allaying that sectional hos-
tility, which is a prominent vice not only of our
great country, but also I regret to add of our lit-
tle State. It is very evident that any gentleman
who is known to be actuated by antipathies and
prejudices in regard to any division or interest
of the State, could not be nominated (or, much
less elected lo, the Chief Executive office. The
knowledge of such feelings on the part of any
individual would render him so unpopular in the
portion of the State or with the interest against
which he had exhibited this enmity, as would
cause him to be rejected by his parly as unavail-
able, or, even if he should have a sufficient num-
ber of infatuated friends to place him before the
people, secure his defeat at the polls.
We will always therefore have as Governor,
a man devoid of narrow local prejudices, and
comprehensive in his political views. His intercourse
with the whole people, the alliances he
will necessarily contract with all interests, and
the obligations under which lie will fall to per-
sons in every quarter of the Commonwealth,
while seeking the popular suffrage, will conduce
to obliterate all latent provincial prepossessions
and arouse within him the noble ambition of ren-
dering his administration beneficial and grateful
to all divisions and all classes of the community.
Elevated to the Chief Magistracy, every motive,
which self-respect, hope of fame and patriotism
can supply, will conspire to deter him from un-
duly favoring any particular class, and from
sanctioning injustice towards any part of his constituency.
It will hardly be asserted in the face of the
frequent manifestations on this floor, that the local
antipathies, to which I have alluded, are not deleteriously
prevalent in this State. I have been
surprised, grieved, almost amazed sir, since I
came here, at finding with how much bitterness
certain counties are opposed to others, what a
fierce conflict is waged between different geo-
graphical divisions, and how contentiously each
quarter of the State is arrayed against its fancied |
