

marked the sudden transfer of power in most parts of the world. Grant then, gentlemen of the small counties, to the majority this protection, and they will, in all likelihood, rest satisfied, at least for a long time—deny it to them, and you provide effectually for a speedy renewal of that agitation which you so much deprecate, and which will not again subside until it has overturned what you consider the bulwarks of your safety. By according this boon, you bestow no means of inflicting injury on yourselves, but only a talisman which will disarm those whom you fear and render them your friends.

I have now disposed, Mr. President, of one of the main causes of that lamentable sectional prejudice, which so unfortunately arrays the different portions of our State each against the other. I have sought to trace it to its source, and to point out a remedy effectual, while harmless, and not less beneficial than efficacious. In support of these assertions, I will now proceed to consider another important cause of those local animosities which distract our little commonwealth, and which have been so unpleasantly exhibited upon this floor.

Maryland has indulged to great excess in partial, special and local legislation. Her government has transcended its proper functions; and assuming a degree of power which should never be exercised by mere agents, has interfered from time to time in enterprises and speculations, which in a free government, are properly left to individual action and voluntary combination.—We have, it is true, already stripped the Legislature of several of those powers through which it has heretofore operated injuriously to certain interests and sections of the State for the benefit of other localities and interests. And, sir, I will here take occasion to say, that I should have been happy to have seen our government made one of merely enumerated and strictly defined powers, even as in this respect, our general government is limited and restricted. I believe that this object could readily be accomplished, and that it would be attended with very great benefit to our beloved State. But the restrictions we have already imposed on the Legislature, those which we hereafter superadd, will tend very much to diminish the evil which I am now considering. Fortify these restrictions by a suspensive veto in the Executive, and you will lessen very much the danger, not only of usurpation by the general Assembly of those powers, expressly withheld, but also of the assumption by it of powers heretofore dormant, which may be hereafter called into life, by the ingenuity and ambition of faithless or misguided public servants.

If you will still go further than you have done in restricting the legislative power; if you will no longer permit it to include the right of special, partial, and local enactments, creating as these unavoidably do, sectional pressures and antagonisms; if you will interpose the check whose adoption I am urging on you, to prevent the exercise by the Assembly of prohibited powers, you will not only take efficient steps towards ex-

tinguishing sectional jealousies, but will, in a great degree abrogate the practical importance of the apportionment of representation. Were there left to the Assembly but those powers which could be exerted only for the general benefit and equal advantage of all portions, and as nearly as might be, of every individual, the members of your Legislature would, by necessity, become the representatives not of their respective counties or cities, but of the whole State. Then the distribution of these representatives would become a question of comparatively trifling moment; and the restraint upon their tendency to exercise authority not entrusted to them, imposed by the supervision of a Governor elected by the whole people, would afford as much as practicable of that security against abuses, which is the grand problem to be solved in the formation of government.

Besides, (as was most lucidly expounded by General Hamilton, in the article in the Federalist from which I have quoted,) by means of the veto power, we can in another way do much towards softening and allaying that sectional hostility, which is a prominent vice not only of our great country, but also I regret to add of our little State. It is very evident that any gentleman who is known to be actuated by antipathies and prejudices in regard to any division or interest of the State, could not be nominated for, much less elected to, the Chief Executive office. The knowledge of such feelings on the part of any individual would render him so unpopular in the portion of the State or with the interest against which he had exhibited this enmity, as would cause him to be rejected by his party as unavailable, or, even if he should have a sufficient number of infatuated friends to place him before the people, secure his defeat at the polls.

We will always therefore have as Governor, a man devoid of narrow local prejudices, and comprehensive in his political views. His intercourse with the whole people, the alliances he will necessarily contract with all interests, and the obligations under which he will fall to persons in every quarter of the Commonwealth, while seeking the popular suffrage, will conduce to obliterate all latent provincial prepossessions and arouse within him the noble ambition of rendering his administration beneficial and grateful to all divisions and all classes of the community. Elevated to the Chief Magistracy, every motive, which self-respect, hope of fame and patriotism can supply, will conspire to deter him from unduly favoring any particular class, and from sanctioning injustice towards any part of his constituency.

It will hardly be asserted in the face of the frequent manifestations on this floor, that the local antipathies, to which I have alluded, are not deleteriously prevalent in this State. I have been surprised, grieved, almost amazed sir, since I came here, at finding with how much bitterness certain counties are opposed to others, what a fierce conflict is waged between different geographical divisions, and how contentiously each quarter of the State is arrayed against its fancied