if ever, happen that the Executive, constituted
as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness
enough to resist the legislature, unless backed
by a certain part of that body itself The King
of Great Britain, with all his splendid attributes,
would not be able to withstand the unanimous
and eager wishes of both Houses of Parliament "
Again vol. II page 809, Mr. Madison observed,
"that the great difficulty in rendering the Execu-
tive competent to its own defence, arose from the
nature of Republican Government, which could
nut give to an individual citizen that settled pre-
eminence in the eyes of the rest. that weight of
property, that personal interest against betraying
the national interest which appertain to an hered-
itary magistrate. In a Republic, personal me-
rit alone could be the ground of political exal-
tation; but it would rarely happen that this me-
rit would be so prominent as to produce uni-
versal acquiesecense. The Executive magistrate
would be envied and assailed by disappointed
competitors; his firmness therefore would need
support."
Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, well known as
one of the most liberal statesman of that day,
afterwards a distinguished ornament of the
Bench, [vide pages 786, 787, of volume II]
"believes as others did that this power would
seldom be used. The legislature would know
that such a power existed and would refrain from
such laws as it would be sure to defeat. Its
silent operation would therefore preserve harmony
and prevent mischief. * * *
But there might be tempestuous moments in
which animos ties may run high between the
Executive and Legislative branches; and in
which the former ought to be able to defend
itself."
And again the same gentlemen, [vide pages
7336 of volume III] "after viewing the subject
with all the coolness and attention possible, was
must apprehensive of a dissolution of the gov-
ernment from the legislature swallowing up all
other powers. * * *
* * Where the Executive was really
formidable, king and tyrant were naturally as-
sociated in the minds of the people: not legislature
and tyranny. But where the Executive
was not formidable, the two last were more
more properly associated.
'After the destruction of the King in Great
Britain, a more peur and unmixed tyranny
sprang up, in the Parliament, than had been ex-
ercised by the Monarch."
It will be seen, moreover, on pages 1333 and
1333, of vol. III, that Mr. Madison was anxious
to unite the Judiciary with the Executive in the
exercise of the suspensive veto, principally on
the ground that the latter, unless supported by
the former, would be too feeble to attempt re-
sistance to the Legislature.
Mr. Eldridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, a prominant
leader of that old Democratic party, whose
mantle is claimed as its heritage by each of the
two great parlies of the present day, will be
found to have advocated the same side of the
question, as will also the Pinckneys and Rut- |
ledges, of South Carolina; Williamson, of North
Carolina; Wythe, Mason and Randolph, of Vir-
ginia; the majority of the Maryland delegation;
the Morrises, of Pennsylvania; Ellsworth of Connecticut,
and King, of Massachusetts.
I might go on, sir, and read many more per-
tinent passages from the records of the proceed.
ings of that body of sages, to whom this nation
owes a debt of undying gratitude! The whole debate
there held on this subject, deserves the careful
perusal and attentive consideration of all who
consider the fathers of our republic to have been
men of rare wisdom and stainless purity of mo-
tive. But I have read enough to show that the
most eminent of those men, of all shades of poli-
tics, concurred as to the propriety and utility of
the limited veto power. I will therefore take
leave of that justly venerated conclaive, and
pass on to the elaborate disquisition on the sub-
ject contained in the 73d number of the "Fede-
eralist," written by that profound political phi-
losopher, and lofty patriot, Alexander Hamilton.
As the members of this body are doubtless
familiar with that admirable exposition and de-
fence of our Federal Constitution, produced by
the united efforts of Madison. Hamilton and Jay,
I will readonly a few of such passages, as ap-
pear to me to be directly fitted to influence our
action under the circumstances.
General Hamilton urges that "the propensity
of the legislative department to intrude upon the
rights, and to absorb the powers of the other de-
partment, has been already more than once sug-
gested, the insufficiency of a mere parchment de-
lineation of the boundaries of each, has also
been remarked upon; and the necessity of fur-
nishing each with constitutional arms for its own
defence, has been inferred and proved. From
these clear and indubitable principles, results
the propriety of a negative, either absolute or
qualified, in the Executive, upon the act of the
legislative branches. Without the one or the
other, the former would be absolutely unable to
defend himself against the depredations of the
latter. He might gradually be stripped of his
authorities by successive resolutions or annihila-
ted by a single vote. And in one mode or the
other, the Legislative and Executive powers
might speedily come to be blended in the same
hands. * * * * *
But the power in question has a further use.
It not only serves as a shield for the execu-
tion, but it furnishes an additional security
against the creation of improper laws. It establishes
a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may hap-
pen to influence a majority of that body, * *
The oftener a measure is brought under exami-
nation, the greater the diversity in the situations
of those who are to examine it, the less must be
the danger of those errors which flow from want
of due deliberation, or of those mishaps which
proceed from the contagion of some common
passion or interest. * * * It may |
