up during that gentleman's absence. He would,
He was elective annually, by the very same Le-
gislatures which, during his administration, would
enact laws It was therefore, a fair presump-
tion, that before making choice of him, a majority
of the Assembly would have ascertained that
he concurred in opinion with them, as to every
measure of importance. Besides, the Executive
power had previously resided in the representa-
tive of the proprietary—a foreigner, irresponsible
to, and not identified with, the interests of
the people; wherefore the exercise of this nega-
tive had become unpopular, and was looked on
with distrust. Smarting under these recollec-
tions, our fore-fathers constituted their Chief
Magistrate a creature of the Legislature, entire-
ly dependant on it, not only as to his election,
but ill almost every other respect. To show that
I am not singular in this view, I will fortify it by
quotations from the writings of an eminent
citizen, whose authority as a constitutional law-
yer and statesman, will command the deference
of all, John V. L. McMahon, after describing
in the opening paragraph of Chapter VII, of his
"History of Maryland," the distribution of the
Legislative power, in our State government, as
being exclusively between the Senate and House
of Delegates, without any control or suspensory
negative on the part of the Executive, goes on to
explain that—
"In this respect, our State government is materially
different, not only from the proprietary
government which preceded it, and that of the
mother country, but also from most of the forms
of State government prevailing around us. Yet
however anomalous this feature of it may at first
appear, it will be found, on closer examination,
to be in perfect consistence with the origin and
nature of our supreme Executive power. When
the Executive is, as to its existence, totally inde-
pendent of the Legislative power; when it
springs from the same source by a different chan-
nel: or when it is clothed with personal rights,
privileges and dignities, which, although the
consequence of official rank are yet distinct from
its purely official powers there is some propriety
in the veto. By such a check only, can its sepa-
rate and independent existence, and the rights
and dignities flowing from that existence, be
effectually protected. * * * *
"In the republican forms of government around
us, which confer the executive veto. we discover
reasons for its existence not applicable to our
Constitution. Under most, if not all of these
governments, the supreme executive springs directly
from the people; and having thus a com-
mon origin with the Legislature, it is clothed
with this power, not for the preservation of its
own privileges, but merely that it may operate
as a salutary check upon legislation generally.
Its existence rests upon the same reasons which
have recommended the division of a Legislature
into two branches; and being established for the
general benefit, and not for the protection of executive
rights, as in England, its controll gene-
rally ceases under circumstances warranting the
inference, that it conflicts with the well ascer-
tained public will. * * * * |
"Such a check, for such purposes, incident to
the office of Governor of Maryland, would be a
moat useless investment of power. He is elected
by the very Legislature upon which it would
operate. He is elected annually, and his re-
eligibility renders him virtually the dependant of
those who elected him, not merely because they
have called him to office, but also because, in the
ordinary course of event, many of them will
pass upon his re-election. To deposit such a
check with an officer so created and so situated,
would be little better than to commit the Legislature
to its own guardianship. It may also be
remarked, that there is less necessity for its existence
under our Constitution, than under those
of the sister States. It will hereafter appear
that in the organization of our Senate, the de-
sign to create a check upon the popular branch
of the Assembly is carried further than in the
constitution of any other Legislative body in the
United States; and it would be visionary to look
for further checks in the grant of an executive
veto."
It will be perceived then that Mr. McMahon
excuses the framers of our old Constitution, for
omitting the veto power on two grounds: 1st,
that the dependant character of our Executive
would have rendered this nugatory and visionary;
and 2nd, that the "organization of our Senate"
afforded a check, upon improvident and hasty
legislation, riot found in the constitutions of other
States. One of these grounds has been entirely
taken away and the other materially weakened,
by the changes which, since the date of that
history, have been made in our organic law.
These new features, with modifications still fur-
ther conforming to the examples around us, we
have already incorporated in the instrument.
which we are preparing as the future Constitu-
tion of the Slate.
In the Convention which formed the unrivalled
Constitution of these United States, no question
was more gravely considered or more elaborate-
ly discussed than that of the veto power.
The reasons, which finally prevailed in that
body of illustrious men, and induced them to
embody, in our Federal compact, this salutary
check on legislation—were, for the most part,
such as are equally applicable to the work in
which we are now engaged. As I cannot hope
to approach, in what I may say, the strength of
language and the cogency of argument which
chacterized these debates, I will ask the Conven-
tion to bear with me while I read a few extracts
from the discussions on this subject as reported
in the "Madison papers."
On page 784 of vol. 11 it will be seen that
Alexander Hamilton moved to give the Execu-
tive "an absolute negative on The laws," on the
ground that there was "no danger of such a pow-
er being too much exercised:" and that Mr.
Madison [page 786 of the same volume] opposed
this unqualified veto as "obnoxious to the tem-
per of this country," but observed at the same
time "that if a proper proportion of each branch
should be required to overrule the objections of
the Executive, it would answer the same pur-
pose as an absolute negative. It would rarely, |
