perhaps be said, that the power of preventing
bad laws includes that of preventing good ones,
and may be used to one purpose, as well as to
the other But this objection will have little
weight with those who can properly estimate the
mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in
the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the
character and genius of our governments They
will consider every institution calculated to re-
strain the excess of law-making, and to keep
things in the same state in which they may hap-
pen to be at any given period, as much more
likely to do good than harm. * * *
The superior weight and influence of the legisla-
tive body in a free government, and the hazard
to the Executive in a trial of strength with that
body, afford a satisfactory security, that the negative
would generally be employed with great
caution; and that hi its exercise there would of-
tener be room for a charge of timidity than rash-
ness."
I must apologise for detaining the Convention
so long, particularly as I have so little practice
in reading aloud, as to be entirely unable to do
justice to the vigorous conceptions and power of
adapting his language to his ends, which were
such marked traits in the intellect of General
Hamilton. But I felt confident that no words of
my own would have one hundredth part of the
force and weight, which those just read by me
merit, and the Convention will, I am sure, not re-
gret the substitution.
I will beg leave to quote from one other high
authority, the very antipode of General Hamil-
ton in political doctrines, and belonging not only
to an opposite school of politics, but to a different
era of our country, and a much later stage in
our national progress and experience. I refer
to the late John C. Calhoun, the most accurate
logician and brilliant reasoner that has ever
graced a legislative body.
In a speech delivered in the United States Sen-
ate, in February 1843, on a resolution looking to
the abolition of the veto power of the President
Mr Calhoun entered into an elaborate examina-
tion of the whole theory of our federal Constitution,
as connected with and influenced by the peculiar
feature which I am endeavoring to per-
suade you to include among the fundamental elements
of the structure of our State. Most of the
remarks uttered on that occasion, by the gifted
man from whom lam about to quote, do not apply
immediately to our task or circumstances
but some passages of that profound speech, general
in their bearing and applicable to all republican
Constitutions, I will trouble you to listen to
Speaking of the necessity for protecting the
President against the encroachments of Congress
Mr. Calhoun says: "To make a division of
power effectual, a veto in one form or another
is indispensable. The right of each to judge for
itself of the extent of the power allotted to it
share, and to protect itself in its exercise, is what
in reality is meant by a division of power Without
it, the allotment to each department would
be a mere partition and no division at all. * *
But this is not the only motive There is another
and deeper, to which the division itself of the |
government into departments is subordination—
to enlarge the popular bhsis, by increasing the
number of voices necessary to its action. * * *
But it may be said that nothing is gained towards
enlarging the popular basis of the government by
the veto power, because the number necessary to
elect a majority to the two houses, without which
the act could not pass, would be sufficient to
elect him, (the President.) That is true." It
is not likely, however, to be true in Maryland,
under the Constitution which we are forming,
and this circumstance strengthens the force of
Mr. Calhoun's observations. He proceeds "but he
may have been elected by a different portion of the
people, or, if not great changes may take place
during his four years, both in the Senate and the
House which may change the majority that
brought him into power, and with it the mea-
sures and policy to be pursued. In either case he
might find it necessary to interpose his veto, to
maintain his views of the Constitution, or the
policy of the party of which he is at the head,
and which elevated him to power. * * *
But a still stronger consideration for vesting him
with the veto power may be found in the differ-
ence of the manner of his election, compared
with that of the members of either House. * *
Even if he should not be a candidate for re-elec-
tion, the desire of having a favorite elected, or
maintaining the ascendancy of his party, may
have, to a considerable extent, the same influ-
ence over him," (i. e incline him to aspire to the
favorable opinion of all portions of the State
over which he presides.) "The effect, in either
case, would he to make him look more to the interest
of the whole, to soften sectional feelings and
asperity—to be more of a patriot, than the parti-
san of any particular interest, and through the
influence of these causes, to give a more general
character to the politics of the country, and
thereby render the collision between sectional interests
less fierce than it would be if legislation
depended solely on the members of the two
Houses, who owe no responsibility but to those
who elected them. * * * But, be the cause
of interposing his veto what it may, its effect in
all cases is to require a greater body of constituency.
through the legislative organs, to put the
government in action against it— to require an-
other key to be struck, and to bring out a more
full and perfect response from the voice of the people.
* * * The veto of itself, important as it is,
sinks into nothing compared to the principle in-
volved. It is but one. and that by no means the
most considerable of those many devices which
I have attempted to explain, and which were intended
to strengthen the popular basis of our
government, and resist its tendency to fall under
the control of the dominant interest, acting
through the more numerical majority,"
I have now, sir. gotten through with my quotations.
and am extremely sorry to have detained
the Convention so long with so much bad reading.
At the period of our revolution, when most of
the States formed their Constitution, there existed
a prejudice against this power in others of
the States, as well as in Maryland, and probably
for the same reason—viz: it having been, up to |
