HARRY HUGHES, Governor

4299

clarity on the point in immunity statutes. In State v. Comes,
237 Md. 271 (1965), the Court (quoting from McCormick on
Evidence), noted the "difficulties and miscarriages in the
application of immunity statutes" that would disappear if
Legislatures enacted "a well-planned and comprehensive Immunity
Act." Id. at 277. The Court stated that:

                "Immunity statutes have as their purpose not a
gift of amnesty but the securing of testimony which
because of privilege could not otherwise be procured.
If the witness is willing to give the evidence
voluntarily, there is no reason for buying it with
immunity. But the traditional language of early
immunity statutes did not make clear the conditions of
exchange. They merely provided that in certain
proceedings the privilege did not exist, but the
witness had the immunity. This vagueness has provoked
disputes." Id. at 276.

In our view, Senate Bill 10 does not create vagueness on the
point but requires the witness to assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege before he or she can expect a grant . of immunity.
Because Senate Bill 10 and House Bill 10 differ so significantly,
we regard them as inconsistent and irreconcilable.

Article 1, § 17 of the Maryland Code recognizes that if
amendments to the same sections of the Code at the same session
are irreconcilable and not possible to construe together, the
latest in date of "final enactment", i.e. signing, shall prevail.
See Elgin v. Capital Greyhound Lines, 192 Md. 303, 317 (1949).
However, we believe there are ample reasons why both bills should
not be signed and the effect left to a proper application of
Article 1, § 17. First, if both bills are signed, the first
issue to be addressed by the Court in dealing with the statute is
not how it has been applied but what it in fact means. Moreover,
a defendant might be expected to argue that by enacting both
bills, the General. Assembly wanted them construed together or as
one modifying the other. This is so because the traditional rule
against repeals by implication has especial force with respect to
bills passed at the same session. In Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. German A.F.I. Co., 132 Md. 380, 385 (1918), the
Court of Appeals said that:

"[I]t is not to be supposed; nothing short of
expressions so plain and positive as to force upon the
mind an irresistible conviction or absolute necessity
would justify a Court in presuming that it was the
intention of Legislature that their Acts passed at the
same session should abrogate and annul one another."

To avoid litigation over the proper meaning of new section
9-910 of the Financial Institutions Article, we believe that it
is advisable to adhere to the policy normally followed when
confronted with inconsistent bills and to sign either the House
or Senate Bill, but not both.