376                                       LAWS OF MARYLAND                             [Ch. 2

14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

Cherry v. State, 9 Md. App. 416 (1970)

applied the Pearce rule to an increase in
sentence following conviction after trial de
novo on appeal from a People's Court. The
General Assembly thereupon amended Art. 5,
§43, to codify the Cherry rule (Ch. 181,
1972) .

In Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32
L.Ed. 2d. 584, 40 L.W. 4703 (1972), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic holding of
Pearce (as set forth in subsection (b)). But
it declined to apply the same rules to
sentencing after a conviction following a de
novo appeal. Thus, the constitutional
mandate which the Court of Appeals had
perceived in Cherry turned out to be
non-existent.

As a result of this judicial history, we have
a constitutional limitation on increase of
sentence if there is an ordinary appeal and
either a remand for sentencing or a
re—conviction after a new trial. And we have
a statutory limitation on increase of
sentence if there is a conviction after a de
novo appeal. What §12—702 proposes is the
codification of the case law, and the
retention of the existing statutory law, thus
providing a uniform approach to the problem,
and one readily accessible to and
understandable by those involved in criminal
sentencing.

GENERAL REVISOR'S NOTES:

In accordance with the underlying philosophy of
the revision of Art. 5 as part of a Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, statutes permitting an
appeal from an administrative agency to a court will
be retained with the statutes pertaining to that
administrative agency. These vary with respect to
scope of review, procedure on appeal, etc.; see
subtitle B, Ch. 1100, Md. Rules. Statutes permitting
a further appeal to the Court of Appeals or Court of
Special Appeals are similarly allocated.