MARVIN MANDEL, Governor                                 375

INFORMATION CONCERNING IDENTIFIABLE CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF THE DEFENDANT OCCURRING AFTER THE ORIGINAL
SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED; AND

(3) THE FACTUAL DATA UPON WHICH THE
INCREASED SENTENCE IS BASED APPEARS AS A PART OF THE
RECORD.

(C) LIMITATION ON SENTENCE FOLLOWING DE NOVO
APPEAL.

IF A DEFENDANT WHO APPEALS PROM A CONVICTION IN
THE DISTRICT COURT IS CONVICTED AFTER A TRIAL DE NOVO
ON APPEAL, THE APPELLATE COURT MAY IMPOSE ANY SENTENCE
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO BE IMPOSED AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE
OFFENSE, OR IT MAY IMPOSE A SENTENCE MORE SEVERE THAN
THAT IMPOSED IN THE DISTRICT COURT BUT ONLY UNDER THE
CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (B) .

REVISOR'S NOTE: Subsection (b) is modelled on Art.
5, §43, as re—enacted by Ch. 181, Acts of
1972. However, it applies the §43
restrictions on increased sentences to any
re—sentencing after a remand for sentencing
or new trial if a second conviction follows.
While limited remands are not always
permissible, Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, and
289 A 2d. 575 (1972) a remand for purposes of
proper sentencing only is permitted; Bauckman

v. State, 9 Md. App. 612 (1970). Subsection

(c), although using different language,
retains the substance of §43, which presently
applies only to sentencing following a
conviction pursuant to a de novo appeal from
the District Court.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)
held that upon re—sentencing credit must be
given for any portion of a sentence
previously served. That rule is reflected in
subsection (a), and is required by the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Pearce also held that if there is a reversal,
a new trial, and a re—conviction, the second
sentence could not be more severe than the
first, except under certain limited
circumstances. That rule is reflected in
subsection (b), and the circumstances
permitting an increased sentence are taken
almost verbatim from Pearce. This rule is
required by the Due Process Clause of the