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374 LAWS OF MARYLAND [Ch.
provision is made applicable to resentencing
following remand by any appellate court. The
second sentence is new; it states the rule of
Wright v. State, 11 Md. App. 673 (1971). A
related question is whether or not credit for
pre—original sentence confinement must be
given if the original sentence was less than
the statutory maximum. In State v. Ewell,
234 Md. 56 (1964) the Court of Appeals
answered that question in the negative.
Thereafter, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969) and Benton v. Maryland, 395
D.S. 784 (1969) were decided. Benton applied
the Federal constitutional double jeopardy
provisions to the states. Pearce stated the
rule requiring credit for a sentence served
(or a fine paid) prior to imposition of a
second sentence (or fine) for the same
offenses, and also imposed strict limitations
on an increase in sentence after a new trial;
see also Cherry v. State, 9 Md. App. 416
(1970); but see Colten v. Kentucky, 42 S.
Ct., (1953). But the question now under
consideration was not expressly decided,
whatever inferences may be gathered from
Pearce and Benton. It was expressly left
open in Wright. Therefore, no statutory
provision on this point is proposed.
However, it should be noted that Ch. 605,
Acts of 1973, contains provisions providing
for certain "good time" credits accruing
during pre—sentence incarceration to be
applied against a sentence.
(B) REMAND FOR SENTENCE OR NEW TRIAL -
LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES.
IF AN APPELLATE COURT REMANDS A CRIMINAL CASE TO A
LOWER COURT IN ORDER THAT THE LOWER COORT MAY
PRONOUNCE THE PROPER JUDGMENT OR SENTENCE, OR CONDUCT
A NEW TRIAL, AND IF THERE IS A CONVICTION FOLLOWING
THIS NEW TRIAL, THE LOWES COURT MAY IMPOSE ANY
SENTENCE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO BE IMPOSED AS PUNISHMENT
FOR THE OFFENSE. HOWEVER, IT MAY NOT IMPOSE A
SENTENCE MORE SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY
IMPOSED FOR THE OFFENSE UNLESS:
(1) THE REASONS FOR THE INCREASED SENTENCE
AFFIRMATIVELY APPEAR;
(2) THE REASONS ARE BASED UPON OBJECTIVE
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