2202                                      VETOES

tutional. "Tax" is the only word in the legal lexicon that properly
describes the payment contemplated by this provision.

2.   The provision in question empowers the county commissioners
to enter into a separate agreement with each individual manufac-
turer. Yet, the statute does not require that these separate agree-
ments be uniform as to manufacturers of the same class, nor does
it require that the payment provided for by any agreement bear a
direct relationship to the assessed value of that property as to which
a manufacturer's taxes have been exempted or abated. In brief, the
statute provides no standard whatever by which the amount of any
payment should be determined. The county commissioners, in enter-
ing into these contemplated agreements, would be bound only by the
single statutory restriction that the amount of the payment must be
"fully set forth therein". Naturally, no manufacturer granted either
an exemption or abatement would agree to pay an amount in excess
of the taxes for which it would be liable in the absence of such an
exemption or abatement. But this is a limitation imposed, not by
statute, but by common sense; were any businessman so foolish as
to enter into such an agreement, the county commissioners would
have the authority to enter into it also. (Of course, the discussion
contained in this paragraph suggests that the specific provision
under consideration also might be unconstitutionally vague; however,
the grounds upon which this ruling rests are so clear and so strong
as to make unnecessary any legal exposition of this additional poten-
tial defect.)

3.   The constitutional principles of equality and uniformity, in
matters of property taxation, enjoin the Legislature from imposing
"upon members of a selected class burdens which are not shared
by others in like circumstances". Anne Arundel County v. English,
supra, p. 522. Stated affirmatively, these principles demand that tax-
payers of the same class having property of the same value pay the
same tax thereon. "Arbitrary taxes on property, without regard to
value, are expressly prohibited [by our Declaration of Rights] ..."
Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577, 587 (1868). When measured by these
constitutional standards, the system of taxation embodied in the
questioned agreement-payment provision is grievously deficient.
Under this provision, a manufacturer's tax would be determined by
nought else than the effectiveness of its bargaining agent in deal-
ings with the county commissioners. Not the assessed value of a
manufacturer's property, but the disposition of the commissioners,
would determine the amount of the tax. The only significance of
the assessment in the negotiation of an agreement, as explained
above, would be that it would fix, for the manufacturer, the maxi-
mum amount it would be willing to pay. When the all-important con-
sideration of value is relegated to such a subordinate function, the
tax imposed in disregard thereof is repugnant to Article 15 of the
Declaration of Rights. Under this proposed system of taxation, it is
not merely possible, but virtually certain, that property owners of
the same class having property of the same value would not be
obliged to pay the same tax thereon. This, also, is constitutionally
repugnant.

In conclusion, a few words might be said with respect to the
wisdom of this proposed addition to the laws of Wicomico County.
A manufacturer granted either an exemption or an abatement, na-
turally, would not be liable for any tax whatever. Therefore, for all