J. MILLARD TAWES, Governor                     2201

am attaching, hereto, a copy of the Attorney General's letter which is
to be considered as a part of this veto message.

With kindest personal regards, and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

(S) J. MILLARD TAWES,

Governor.
JMT/ths

Letter from State Law Department on House Bill No. 192

April 10, 1963.

Honorable J. Millard Tawes
Governor of Maryland
State House
Annapolis, Maryland

Re: House Bill No. 192
Dear Governor Tawes:

House Bill 192, submitted to this office for a review of its legal
sufficiency, purports to revise the present local laws of Wicomico
County respecting "the exemption from or abatement of county taxes
on machinery, equipment and tools of manufacturers in Wicomico
County, to specify the procedure and requirements for the exemption
or abatement .....". In addition to these revisions of the existing
law, the bill provides: "The county commissioners are further
authorized and empowered to enter into an agreement with such
manufacturers whether owned by an individual, firm or corporation
to provide for the payment of some certain sum fully set forth
therein, to said county each year said abatement or exemption is in
effect, in lieu of said taxes." This last provision and the practice
which it sanctions have no statutory antecedents.

It is the opinion of this office that this provision, authorizing the
county commissioners to enter into agreements with manufacturers
for the payment of a sum "in lieu of said taxes", violates the con-
stitutional mandates of Articles 15 and 23 of the Declaration of
Rights. Both of these articles—the first, explicitly; the second, by
sound judicial construction—require equal protection, equality and
uniformity in matters of taxation. Anne Arundel County v. English,
182 Md. 514 (1943). Our conclusion that these standards are not
met by House Bill 192 rests upon the following reasoning:

1. This legislation states that any payment made pursuant to any
agreement between the county commissioners and a manufacturer
granting a tax exemption or abatement shall be considered a pay-
ment made "in lieu of said taxes". This language is a mere semantic
device which in no way can dissuade one from the obvious conclu-
sion that, regardless of its name, any payment made pursuant to
such an agreement nonetheless would be a tax, i.e., a burden laid
for the support of government and for public purposes. 1 Cooley,
The Law of Taxation, Sections 1-6 (Fourth Edition, 1924). Any
argument to the contrary could only be made by emphasizing those
very features of this payment provision which render it unconsti-