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ed, and served as an escort and guard, when there really had been
not the slightest, demonstration of popular violence. In Boston it
will be remembered, the President of the United States, authorized
the use of the military to aid the Marshal in executing the Fugitive
Slave Law. But it is not without a sense of humiliation that I
notice such captious and frivolous objections, and therefore shall
not multiply instances in point

One other popular error, in connection with this subject and
I have done. It has been urged with more zeal than intelligence,
that I have done violence to the Bill of Rights of Maryland, which
says:

"Art. 27. That in all cases and at all limes, the military ought
to be under strict subordination to, and control of the civil power."

In connection with the foregoing, I quote two sections from Art.
I of the Constitution of Maryland, as follows :

"Sec. 9. The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the
land and naval forces of the State, and may call out the militia to
repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and enforce the execution
of the laws; but shall not take command in person, without the
consent of the Legislature.

"Sec. 10. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."

These two sections devolve the entire discretion and responsi-
bility upon the Governor, refer to the whole State, including all
its cities and counties, and recognize no coordinate authority any
where, or in any individual. He is not required to wait the ini-
tiative of any subordinate civil power. On the contrary, it is as
much his sacred duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" and to use military power for this purpose if necessary,
as it is to perform the simplest duty of his office. Indeed the
superior importance of the duty in one case,—if I may allow
grades of importance in official duty—enhances at once his obli-
gation and responsibility before the people, with respect to its
performance. And in a matter touching the right of suffrage, and
the purity of the ballot-box, his obligations are paramount, espe-
cially when the rights and interests of the people of the whole
State, are identified with the issue. In relation to my interposi-
tion in Baltimore, although my proceedings were local as respects
the purpose to be accomplished,—the maintainance of the peace,
and the security of the elective rights of its citizens, yet the
interests of the whole people of the State were also involved.
It was therefore quite as proper for any citizen of the State
to direct my attention to affairs in Baltimore, as it was for any
citizen of Baltimore itself. It was indeed my duty to act without
suggestion or invitation, the moment I became satisfied that
"the execution of the laws" would be forcibly resisted or stayed.

It was my duty, and I recognize it to the fullest extent, to dis-
criminate between such disorder and disturbance, as is almost in-