

ed, and served as an escort and guard, when there really had been not the slightest demonstration of popular violence. In Boston it will be remembered, the President of the United States, authorized the use of the military to aid the Marshal in executing the Fugitive Slave Law. But it is not without a sense of humiliation that I notice such captious and frivolous objections, and therefore shall not multiply instances in point.

One other popular error, in connection with this subject and I have done. It has been urged with more zeal than intelligence, that I have done violence to the Bill of Rights of Maryland, which says:

"Art. 27. That in all cases and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to, and control of the civil power."

In connection with the foregoing, I quote two sections from Art. I of the Constitution of Maryland, as follows:

"Sec. 9. The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the State, and may call out the militia to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and enforce the execution of the laws; but shall not take command in person, without the consent of the Legislature.

"Sec. 10. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

These two sections devolve the entire discretion and responsibility upon the Governor, refer to the whole State, including all its cities and counties, and recognize no co-ordinate authority anywhere, or in any individual. He is not required to wait the initiative of any subordinate civil power. On the contrary, it is as much his sacred duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and to use military power for this purpose if necessary, as it is to perform the simplest duty of his office. Indeed the superior importance of the duty in one case,—if I may allow grades of importance in official duty—enhances at once his obligation and responsibility before the people, with respect to its performance. And in a matter touching the right of suffrage, and the purity of the ballot-box, his obligations are paramount, especially when the rights and interests of the people of the whole State, are identified with the issue. In relation to my interposition in Baltimore, although my proceedings were local as respects the purpose to be accomplished,—the maintainance of the peace, and the security of the elective rights of its citizens, yet the interests of the whole people of the State were also involved. It was therefore quite as proper for any citizen of the State to direct my attention to affairs in Baltimore, as it was for any citizen of Baltimore itself. It was indeed my duty to act without suggestion or invitation, the moment I became satisfied that "the execution of the laws" would be forcibly resisted or stayed.

It was my duty, and I recognize it to the fullest extent, to discriminate between such disorder and disturbance, as is almost in-