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390
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CITY OF BALTIMORE. [ART. 4.
oath or affirmation that the said plea is true, and that
he verily believes that he will be able, at the trial of
the cause, to produce sufficient evidence to support
the said plea.
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Ibid s 8.
Plaintiffs affi-
davit, &c.
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168. The plaintiff shall not be entitled to judg-
ment under either of the three preceding sections,
unless at the time of bringing his action he shall
file with his declaration an affidavit or affirmation,
if he is conscientiously scrupulous as to taking an
oath, stating the true amount that the defendant is
indebted to him, over and above all discounts, and
shall also file the bond, bill of exchange, promissory
note, or other writing or account by which the de-
fendant is so indebted ; and the said affidavit or
affirmation, may be made before any of the persons
who may take an affidavit or affirmation, to author-
ize the issuing of a foreign attachment, and may be
certified in the same manner.
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Ibid. s. n.
Assessment of
damages by
court.
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169. When any judgment by default shall be
entered under the preceding sections, the court
may assess the damages on proof thereof, without
empanelling a jury to do so.
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Ibid, c 10
Writs return-
able at election
of plaintiff.
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170. Writs of execution issued out of the superior
court of Baltimore, or the court of common pleas,
may be made returnable, at the election of the plain-
tiff, to the next succeeding return day of the court
from which said writ was issued, or to the next suc-
ceeding term of the said court.
In force from February 4, 1864.
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NOTE —Held that, under the act of 1858, c 323 a plaintiff could obtain judgment by default
on an open Account, verified by affidavit, at the term or on the rule day to which the defend-
ant was summoned and Tailed to appear, but the court could not, at the same term, extend
such judgment by assessment of damages and costs and that the plaintiff, ID such a cage,
was entitled to final judgment only in case the defendant fulled to appear before the first day
of the term or rule any next thereafter, and then the judgment could go only for the amount
of the account thus authenticated but that the court has no power to allow interest on the
account which should have been ascertained by a jury on a writ of inquiry [But see 1864, c.
lis, Public General Laws, Art LXXV, sec. 03 and 1804, c 6, s 9,—sec 169 of this Article]
Held further, that though the final judgment would be struck out because improperly and
prematurely extended and because interest was allowed by the court, yet, the judgment by
default, for the defendant's failure to appeal, would not be disturbed Mailhouse v Inloes
et al. 18 Md 328 See Gardner T Jenkins, 14 Md CO The art of 1868, c. 323 did not conflict
with the right of removal of causes from one court to another, provided for by the Constitu-
tion and Acts of Assembly. Griffin v. Leslie, 20 Md. 19.
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