2396 ARTICLE 75.

right to recover without regard to amount jury may ascertain to be due. A judg-
ment by default if regularly entered is as binding as any other as far as respects
power and jurisdiction of court in declaring plaintiff entitled to recover. Heffner v.
Lynch, 21 Md. 555; Green v. Hamilton, 16 Md. 329.

Where parties fix amount of recovery by agreement, the inquisition is waived and
final judgment may be entered. The final judgment does not relate back and take
effect as of date of judgment by default, and latter judgment is not a lien on defen-
dant's property. Davidson v. Myers, 24 Md. 554.

Where three years have elapsed since a judgment by default, although there
is no change of parties, the judgment should be revived and extended by a sci. fa.
Bridges v. Adams, 32 Md. 580.

This section contains no limitation as to time in which inquisitions on judgments
by default must be had. The act of 1864, ch. 175, applies to judgments entered by
default prior to its passage. There is no obligation upon court to delay entering judg-
ment upon an inquisition, although it may delay where occasion requires. Stansbury
v. Keady, 29 Md. 367.

Amount of damages assessed by court without a jury under this section and a
practice act of Baltimore city is not open for revision on appeal when no exception
on that ground was taken, unless damages exceed the amount claimed in the
declaration. Morris v. Wrenschall, 34 Md. 502.

Act of 1794, ch. 46, is remedial, and does not interfere with the statute of VIII
and IX William III, ch. 11, providing for assessment of damages where there is a
judgment by default in action on bond with collateral conditions. Wilmer v. Harris,
5 H. & J. 8.

Act of 1794, ch. 46, did not give the right to an inquiry of damages where none
existed before. Hopewell v. Price, 2 H. & G. 276.

Cited but not construed in Martindale v. Brock, 41 Md. 581.

See art. 26, sec. 18.

An. Code, sec. 90. 1904, sec. 90. 1888, sec. 87. 1785, ch. 80, sec. 13.

95. In all cases of actions brought for the penalty of any bond, bill,
covenant or contract with penalty, the jury may, under the direction of
the court, upon the plea of payment or performance of the conditions or
terms of the contract, ascertain and by their verdict find what sum of
money is really and justly due to the plaintiff; and upon such finding,
judgment shall be entered by the court for the penalty, to be released upon
payment of the sum of money so found to be due, and interest on the same
till paid, and costs of suit; and the sum really due as aforesaid, or in any
other manner ascertained, upon bonds and other instruments of writing,
with penalty, shall be considered in law as the true debt and shall be so
pleaded by and allowed to administrators and others.

The statute of VIII and IX William III, ch. 11, sec. 8, when taken in connection
with this section, does not prevent repeated actions on a bond as breaches occur.
This section treats sum really due as true debt secured by bond, and renders inter-
vention of a court of equity against the recovery of penalty of bond for any breach
however small, unnecessary. Orendorff v. Utz, 48 Md. 304; Ahl v. AM, 60 Md. 208.
A scire facias on a judgment upon a bond which does not set out amount found
to be due, does not set forth a good and perfect judgment, since if amount due
was ascertained, it should have been set out, and if it was not ascertained, judgment
was merely interlocutory. McKnew v. Duvall, 45 Md. 510.

This section applied. Warren v. Kendrick, 113 Md. 613; State v. Tabler, 41 Md.
239; State y. Wilson, 38 Md. 344...

This section referred to in discussing the allowance of interest upon the claim of
creditors in equity. Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bl. 370.

Legal Sufficiency of Evidence.

An. Code, sec. 91. 1904, sec. 91. 1894, ch. 516, sec. 87. 1924, ch. 151.

96. If the defendant in the trial of any action in a court of law, includ-
ing issues from another court, shall, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence