PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCESS AT LAW. 2395

the same to be struck out on such terms as to costs and otherwise as to such
court may seem reasonable.

Held that if plea had been technically good, the court would have been justified
in striking it out under this section. Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 552.

See notes to sec. 91.

Extending Judgments.

An. Code, sec. 89. 1904, sec. 89. 1888, sec. 86. 1794, ch. 46. 1864, ch. 175.

94. In all cases in any action on any promissory note, bill, bond or
open account in which an interlocutory judgment or judgment by default
has been or shall hereafter be entered in any of the courts of this State
whereby the right of the plaintiff is established but the damages sustained
by him are not ascertained, the judge of the court where such judgment is,
on motion of the plaintiff or of his attorney and the production to him of
the promissory note, bill of exchange, bond, record or writing obligatory
upon which the suit was brought, or upon legal and satisfactory proof of
the correctness and amount of the claim where the suit was brought to
recover a debt due upon open account, shall assess the damages and order
the judgment to be extended for the amount so found to be due, and in-
terest on the same till paid, and costs of suit. In all other cases in which
an interlocutory judgment or judgment by default has been or shall here-
after be entered, the judge of the court where such judgment is, shall, on
motion of the plaintiff or his attorney, make an order in the nature of a
writ of inquiry, to charge the jury in attendance in such court to inquire
of the damages and costs sustained by the plaintiff in such action, which
said inquiry shall be made and the evidence given in open court in the
same manner and under the same regulations as in other jury trials; and
after the said jury, charged as aforesaid, shall have considered thereof,
they shall forthwith return their inquisition under their hands and seals
and the court shall order such judgment to be extended in accordance with
the terms of such finding of the jury.

Errors and irregularities.

A fi. fa and an attachment held invalid because there was no entry of an inter-
locutory judgment before inquisition, nor any final judgment rendered upon inquisi-
tion. Griffith v. Lynch, 21 Md. 578.

Where an order under act of 1794, ch. 4.6, charges the jury to inquire of the
damages, omitting " and costs," and inquisition is for damages " and about ten
dollars for costs," these are mere formal defects which may be cured by amendment.
Kiersted v. Rogers, 6 H. & J. 287. And see Harris v. Jaflray, 3 H. & J. 543.

Where judge assesses damages without a jury, declaration containing common
counts and a special count claiming unliquidated damages, appellate court will
assume in absence of all proof to contrary, that court in assessing damages pro-
ceeded under common counts, and not under special count. How question of such
irregularity should be raised. Homer v. O'Laughlin, 29 Md. 472.

Generally.

Act of 1794, ch. 46, places inquisition on a judgment by default on same footing
with other jury trials. Parties may pray the opinion of court, take bills of exception
and appeal as in other cases. The inquisition may be set aside for same grounds
as would avail on motion for new trial. Excessive damages. Evidence. Green v.
Hamilton, 16 Md. 330.

Act of 1794, ch. 46, assumes and proceeds on the theory that all interlocutory
judgments, where inquisitions are required to give them effect, establish plaintiff's