ART. 45] LEASES——DISTRESS. 1175

1004, art. 45, sec. 16. 1888, art. 15, sec. 19. 1880, ch. 253. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 16.

16. Any married woman against whom any proceeding may be taken
under the two preceding sections shall have power to appoint an attorney
at law to act for her in such proceeding.

Where a husband without his wife's authority employs counsel for her, she
is not bound. Taylor v. Welslager, 90 Md. 416.

Ibid. sec. 17. 1888, art. 45, sec. 14. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 17. 1867, ch. 223

1900, ch. 135.

17. In all cases where leases for a definite term, or for a term of
years, renewable forever, have been or may hereafter be made to a
married woman, and the rent therein stipulated to be paid shall be in
arrear and unpaid, it shall be lawful for the landlord to levy said rent
by distress in the same manner as if the lessee were a feme sole; and in
case of no sufficient distress being found on said premises, to make such
re-entry or bring such action for recovery of the demised premises as
he or she might do if the lessee were feme sole and had covenanted for
the payment of said rents and to suffer such re-entry to be made.

Prior to the act of 1898, a married woman might be sued under this section
without the joinder of her husband. Cruzen v. McKalg, 57 Md. 458; Worth-
ington v. Cooke, 52 Md. 309.

As to distress, see art. 53, sec. 8.

Ibid. sec. 18. 1888, art. 45, sec. 15. 1867, ch. 223. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 18.

18. In all deeds made to married women since March 19, 1867, of
real estate or chattels real, it shall be competent for the grantee or
lessee to bind herself and her assigns by any covenant running with or
relating to said real estate or chattels real, the same as if she were a
feme sole.

The husband should not be joined in a suit against the wife under this
section; the remedy is at law. Worthington v. Cooke, 52 Md. 307.
This section held to have no appllcaton. Davis v. Carroll, 71 Md. 571.
Prior to this section, a married woman was not capable of bindng herself by
a covenant. Armstrong v. Kerns, 61 Md. 366.
Cited but not construed in Cruzen v. McKaig, 57 Md. 462.

Ibid. sec. 19. 1888, art. 45, sec. 13. 1798, ch. 101, sub-chapter 5, sec. 8.
1898, ch. 457, sec. 19.

19. A husband bringing a personal action to recover in right of his
wife after her death may declare specifically setting forth in the usual
manner how the debt or right accrued to his wife, and stating further
that by marriage the debt or right devolved on him.

For a case apparently now inapplicable by reason of changes in the law,
see Hubbard v. Barcus, 38 Md. 181.

Cited but not construed in In Re Lee's Estate, 76 Md. 111.

Ibid. sec. 20. 1900, ch. 633, sec. 19 A.

20. A married woman may contract with her husband and may
form a copartnership with her husband or with any other person or
persons in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, and upon all
such contracts, partnership or otherwise, a married woman may sue and
be sued as fully as if she were a feme sole.