

1904, art. 45, sec. 16. 1888, art. 15, sec. 19. 1880, ch. 253. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 16.

16. Any married woman against whom any proceeding may be taken under the two preceding sections shall have power to appoint an attorney at law to act for her in such proceeding.

Where a husband without his wife's authority employs counsel for her, she is not bound. *Taylor v. Welslager*, 90 Md. 416.

Ibid. sec. 17. 1888, art. 45, sec. 14. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 17. 1867, ch. 223
1900, ch. 135.

17. In all cases where leases for a definite term, or for a term of years, renewable forever, have been or may hereafter be made to a married woman, and the rent therein stipulated to be paid shall be in arrear and unpaid, it shall be lawful for the landlord to levy said rent by distress in the same manner as if the lessee were a *feme sole*; and in case of no sufficient distress being found on said premises, to make such re-entry or bring such action for recovery of the demised premises as he or she might do if the lessee were *feme sole* and had covenanted for the payment of said rents and to suffer such re-entry to be made.

Prior to the act of 1898, a married woman might be sued under this section without the joinder of her husband. *Cruzen v. McKaig*, 57 Md. 458; *Worthington v. Cooke*, 52 Md. 309.

As to distress, see art. 53, sec. 8.

Ibid. sec. 18. 1888, art. 45, sec. 15. 1867, ch. 223. 1898, ch. 457, sec. 18.

18. In all deeds made to married women since March 19, 1867, of real estate or chattels real, it shall be competent for the grantee or lessee to bind herself and her assigns by any covenant running with or relating to said real estate or chattels real, the same as if she were a *feme sole*.

The husband should not be joined in a suit against the wife under this section; the remedy is at law. *Worthington v. Cooke*, 52 Md. 307.

This section held to have no application. *Davis v. Carroll*, 71 Md. 571.

Prior to this section, a married woman was not capable of binding herself by a covenant. *Armstrong v. Kerns*, 61 Md. 366.

Cited but not construed in *Cruzen v. McKaig*, 57 Md. 462.

Ibid. sec. 19. 1888, art. 45, sec. 13. 1798, ch. 101, sub-chapter 5, sec. 8.
1898, ch. 457, sec. 19.

19. A husband bringing a personal action to recover in right of his wife after her death may declare specifically setting forth in the usual manner how the debt or right accrued to his wife, and stating further that by marriage the debt or right devolved on him.

For a case apparently now inapplicable by reason of changes in the law, see *Hubbard v. Barcus*, 38 Md. 181.

Cited but not construed in *In Re Lee's Estate*, 76 Md. 111.

Ibid. sec. 20. 1900, ch. 633, sec. 19 A.

20. A married woman may contract with her husband and may form a copartnership with her husband or with any other person or persons in the same manner as if she were a *feme sole*, and upon all such contracts, partnership or otherwise, a married woman may sue and be sued as fully as if she were a *feme sole*.