27

had arrived to make a successful advance in the direction of Washington, and his
opinion in the matter should be paramount to any other. Upon this subject
General Beauregard says in his official report :

"An army which had fought as ours did on that day, against uncommon
odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food except
a hastily snatched, scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition for an eager,
effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle."

President Davis said :

"It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field
would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned
and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and
victory did the Generals on the field propose an advance on the Capital, nor
does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt
such a movement."

All of this has been particularly dwelt upon here for the reason that the
idea has always prevailed in the South that there was a diversity of opinion
between President Davis and Generals Johnston and Beauregard as to the
propriety of advancing upon Washington after the battle of Manassas. There
was no such diversity. The impossibility of a successful advance upon the Capital
was apparent, and the idea was never entertained for a moment.