

had arrived to make a successful advance in the direction of Washington, and his opinion in the matter should be paramount to any other. Upon this subject General Beauregard says in his official report :

“ An army which had fought as ours did on that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food except a hastily snatched, scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition for an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle.”

President Davis said :

“ It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned and within supporting distance of fresh troops ; nor after the actual battle and victory did the Generals on the field propose an advance on the Capital, nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a movement.”

All of this has been particularly dwelt upon here for the reason that the idea has always prevailed in the South that there was a diversity of opinion between President Davis and Generals Johnston and Beauregard as to the propriety of advancing upon Washington after the battle of Manassas. There was no such diversity. The impossibility of a successful advance upon the Capital was apparent, and the idea was never entertained for a moment.