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HEPBURN'S CASE. 97
republic; or can be allowed to indulge their feelings of benevo-
lence in bestowing such property on any one, merely as a generous
donation, without regard to any consideration of public good. The
discretionary power of the General Assembly, it may be admitted,
is and must be extensive; perhaps, beyond control from any other
co-ordinate department of the government; but still it must be
limited by a sound regard to the general benefit of the people; and
therefore, should not be allowed from a mere impulse of kindness
to make a gift of the public funds to any one who had rendered no
service to the state; nor done any thing that might be considered
as a valuable consideration or a public benefaction, (d)
If the unlimited discretionary power of the General Assembly
themselves over the public property can be susceptible of question,
surely no court of justice should consider itself as having been
clothed with any such power by that department, without the most
express declaration to that effect. This court must therefore, be
extremely guarded how it assumes an authority from the Legisla-
ture to dole out the charities, or to cast abroad the bounties of the
state. If however, laying aside the rules of law and equity by
which the rights of property are regulated, it is to be determined
upon principles of general morality, whether or not a petitioner is
to be paid from the public treasury any amount he may ask or
claim, then the General Assembly must be much better judges of
such a matter than the Chancellor, because they are presumed to
be, and are in truth, much more intimately acquainted with the
feelings and disposition of the people than any single member of
the judiciary can be. But I cannot allow myself to believe, that
the Genera] Assembly intended to clothe the Chancellor with any
such large and unqualified powers. He is directed to decide
according to the equity and right of the matter; that is, according
to those established rules by which he is governed in similar cases ;
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(d) 3 Secret Jour. Cong. 197; 1784 ch. 37, s. 7; 1788, ch. 44, s. 20. Construc-
tion construed, by John Taylor, of Caroline, 261.
'We, (Congress,) are not the almoners of the American people, the dispensers of
their charity, but agents, with limited powers, entrusted with the control of the
public purse, for the sole purpose of applying it to the current exigencies of the
government, in the advancement of great principles of public policy connected with
the exercise of powers substantively conferred upon us, and in the discharge of
individual claims arising from our own, or the engagements of our predecessors.'
Speech, of Mr. Berrien, a Senator of Georgia, in the Senate of the U. States, 30th
January, 1828. —National Intelligencer, 19th April, 1828.
13 v.3
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