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96 HEPBURN'S CASE.
Robert Mollison, which may remain in the treasury unappropriated.
And on the part of the State, it shall be the duty of the Attorney-
General, or one of his deputies, to attend the investigation, (a)
16th December, 1830.—BLAND, Chancellor.—This case stand-
ing ready for hearing, and the solicitors of the petitioner and the
Attorney-General having committed their several arguments to
writing, they with the proceedings were read and considered.
In England, as in this instance, jurisdiction is frequently given
to the Chancellor by private or special acts of parliament; and in
all such cases he adheres strictly to the special authority so given. (b)
Here too, the Chancellor has always held himself bound to follow
the authority exactly as given to the full extent of the constitutional
competency of the General Assembly to confer any such authority.
But in this case the solicitors of the petitioner and the Attorney-
General differ materially as to the meaning of this resolution.
On the part of the petitioner it is contended, that the Legisla-
ture meant, that neither the lapse of time should be relied on as a
defence; nor that the technical rules of equity which prevail
between individuals should be applied to the case.
On the other hand the Attorney-General insists, that all the sub-
stantial principles of equity by which a similar controversy between
individuals would be governed, should be applied to this case.
This difference as to the intention of the Legislature, renders it
necessary to determine, in the first place, what are the principles
by which the Chancellor is to be governed; since it is obvious,
that the general complexion of the investigation, as well as the
final judgment, must altogether, or very much depend upon the
circumstance, from which of those positions he sets out. And,
therefore, this preliminary question must be disposed of before the
case itself can be considered.
It may be safely assumed, as well settled, that all our govern-
ments are, in their nature, delegations of power, that they are
trusts exercised for the use and benefit of a sovereign people; and
that the governments of the states, though less limited than that of
the Union, yet have their general as well as their special limita-
tions, (e) And therefore, it may well be doubted whether the
General Assembly of this state can, constitutionally, make any
capricious or arbitrary disposition of the money or property of the
(a) 1828, No. 26.—(b) 2 Mad. Chan. 719; Mitf. Plea. 81.—(c) Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 386.
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