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670 THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.
tate. (p) But our law, although it directs judgments and decrees
to be first paid, expressly protects executors and administrators,
who proceed as the law directs, as well from the claims of judg-
ment creditors, as of all others of which they had no notice, (q)
From all that has been said, it is therefore clear, that these
judgments obtained by Robert Oliver and by others, to the use of
Charles Carroll, in Baltimore County Court, gave them a lien in
virtue thereof upon all the real estate of The Cape Sable Company
lying in Anne Arundel or any other county of the state.
The act of Assembly by which these defendants The Cape Sable
Company, were incorporated, declares, 'that the lands, tenements,
stock, property, and estate of The Cape Sable Company, is and
shall be held as real estate, and shall descend as such agreeably to
the acts of Assembly in such cases made and provided, when not
otherwise disposed of. ' (r) And the trustees who made the sale
of their estate under the decree in this case, in their report describe
it as consisting of lands, of slaves, of horses, of the implements of
the manufactory, &c.; that is, of real estate technically and pro-
perly so called, and of mere perishable personalty.
It would seem to be perfectly clear, according to the first branch
of this section of the act of incorporation, that this mere perishable
personalty is as much a part of that stock, property, and estate of
The Cape Sable Company, which it is declared shall be held as
real estate, as their lands and tenements; and that it must be so
treated as far as practicable, whatever inconveniences may ensue.
But it is added, that the estate shall descend as such when not
otherwise disposed of; thereby indicating it to have been the inten-
tion of the act, that it should only be so held as regarded the inte-
rests of the stockholders themselves; and as real estate to descend
accordingly from them; not that the actual legal character of the
perishable moveables should be changed as well in regard to the
rights and interests of all other persons as the stockholders them-
selves, (s)
It was upon this ground, that I ordered the sheriff's poundage
fees to be rated and ascertained; distinguishing as the law directs,
in that respect, between the real and personal property taken in
execution. It was upon that ground also, that the injunction in
(p) Searle v. Lane, 2 Vern. 88; Nimmo v. The Commonwealth, 4 Hen. & Mun.
57. -(q) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 8, s. 15, 17; 1802, ch. 101, s. S. —(r) 1818, ch. 195,
s. 8. —(s) Binney's case, 2 Bland, 146.
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