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THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE. 669
county of the state, returnable formerly to the General Court; (m)
and now before itself; (n) were all alike liens upon the real estate
of the defendant every where. Whence it appears, that these last
mentioned acts of Assembly; (o) did no more, in effect, than to
harmonize our code by giving to all judgments and decrees,
whether of the County Court, the General Court, the Court of
Chancery, or the Court of Appeals, the same efficacy against the
real estate of the defendant in whatever county of the state it might
be found; and consequently gave a lien which fastened upon it
from the date of such judgment or decree.
If it were at all necessary or expedient to give to the judgments
of all the courts of the state the same pervading efficacy, during
the existence of the General Court, when there was a court of
common law whose jurisdiction extended over the whole state, and
in which a judgment with such a wide spread lien, might have
been obtained, it certainly is much more so now, since that court
has been abolished; and particularly as the affirmance of a county
court judgment places it in the power of the party to obtain exe-
cution from the Court of Appeals, and thus to give to his judicial
lien an effect co-extensive with the range of the process of that
court. And when it is recollected, that no inhabitant can be
arrested or sued in any other county than that in which he resides,
it will be seen, that this general operation of the lien, arising from
the judgment of a county court, can be attended with little or no
inconvenience or hardship to a purchaser, or to any one else;
because such a judicial lien can only originate, and therefore must
necessarily be found of record in the county court of the county
in which the defendant resided at the time of the institution of
the suit.
But as a suit may be brought against one who absconds or who
is not an inhabitant of Maryland, in any county court of the state,
it may be inconvenient to ascertain the existence of a judicial Men
upon any lands held by him in this state; it is, however, an incon-
venience arising out of the peculiar nature of things, and could not
be avoided without very injuriously trenching upon the rule which
has established the generality of such liens. These remarks may
be applied with the same force to an executor or administrator,
supposing him to be bound, as in England, to take notice, at his
peril, of all judgments and decrees against his testator or intes-
(m) 1800, ch. 69. —(n) 1810, ch. 156. —(o) 1794, ch, 54; 1795, ch. 23.
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