|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE, 661
ments. The lien was considered as necessarily arising from the
liability of the land to be taken in execution; and, therefore, the
statutes which gave the elegit, the statute staple, statute mer-
chant, and recognizance, all alike carried with them this lien, as an
inseparable incident of the liabilities they imposed. Hence it was
regarded as a general rule, that no such lien could be fastened upon
any species of property which was not so liable to be taken in
execution. And, consequently, upon the same principles, that no
such lien could attach upon any lands lying out of the jurisdiction
of the court in which the judgment was rendered, and beyond the
reach of any execution which could be issued from it. (o) And
this was, in truth, the general rule of the common law in relation
to this lien.
The jurisdiction of all courts of common law is confined within
certain prescribed territorial limits. They are either themselves,
in this respect, circumscribed within particular local divisions; or,
if their jurisdiction embraces the whole state, they can only act
through the agency of such officers as sheriffs, whose powers ex-
tend only over certain counties or districts of the state; and all
their process has an express reference to such territorial divisions
of the state, (p) Hence it is, that at common law, even criminal
process was not allowed to run from county to county; nor was
there any civil process emanating from any court, however com-
prehensive its jurisdiction, which could be directed indiscriminately
to all, or to any sheriff, or any executive officer of any other class,
to be executed wherever the party or his property might be found
within the state.
In England, in all actions instituted in the courts of Westmin-
ster, the plaintiff was obliged to give to his cause of action a venue
or locality, as well with a view to its being placed in the most suit-
able situation for trial, as that he should thereby designate those
territorial executive officers by whom alone the law could be en-
forced; and a jury convened for the trial of the disputed facts. (q)
And, therefore, although the general jurisdiction of those courts
extends over every county of the realm, yet that jurisdiction is
nothing more than an aggregation of the several county jurisdic-
tions; for, nothing is within their reach which is not to be found
within the body of some one of those counties; and which cannot
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(o) Harris v.. Saunders, 10 Com. Law Hep. 373. —(p) Kames' Prin. Eq. b. 3, c. 7
and 8. —(q) Tidd's Prac. 370; Mortyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 176.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
