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660 THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.
tion and presumption of satisfaction on the 26th of May, 1824,
when the lien arising from Olivers judgment attached. And,
therefore, as I have shewn upon a former occasion, (1) the lien of
those judgments held by Carroll, could not have been so revived,
even by a scire facias, much less by a mere agreement between the
parties to them, as to overreach that lien of Oliver's judgment,
which had, in the interval, fastened upon the real estate of the de-
fendant. Taking it for granted then, that all the proceedings of
Anne Arundel County Court, upon those four judgments, held by
Carroll, were in every respect regular and valid, still Oliver's lien
is entitled to a preference in satisfaction. But, notwithstanding
what Carroll has said in his answer, the lien arising from his judg-
ments of Anne Arundel County Court, was virtually relinquished
by him, by the institution of the suits and the judgments obtained
by him in Baltimore County Court, on the 4th of June, 1824; and,
consequently, upon this ground also, Oliver's judgment must be
respected as a prior lien to that arising from those held by Carroll,
and must be allowed a preference in satisfaction accordingly.
It is here proper, however, to recollect, that the act of Assembly
which enlarges the time within which a fieri facias may be issued
on a judgment to three years; and, consequently, so far prolongs
the continuance of a judicial lien, does not apply to any judgments
rendered before the 19th of February, 1824, when that law was
passed, (m)
But these judgments on which Oliver and Carroll found their
claims were all of them rendered in Baltimore County Court; and
it is insisted, that they cannot therefore be considered as liens upon
any of the real estate of The Cape Sable Company, not lying within
the jurisdiction of that court. This is a point of law which it is
said, yet remains to be finally determined.
I have, upon a former occasion, endeavoured to trace the origin
and fully to explain the nature and extent of a judicial lien within
the range of the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment
was rendered, (n) And it appears, that this lien, which is not
given in express terms, by any legislative enactment whatever, is an
incident or consequence arising, according to the principles of the
common law, from that statute which declared, that lands should
be liable to be taken in execution for the satisfaction of suck judg-
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(I) Coombs v. Jordan, ante 284. —(m) 1823, ch. 194. —(n) Coombs v. Jordan,
ante 284.
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