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POST v. MACKALL.
Here there is n0 proof of the band-writing of these endorse-
ments, or that they were really made at the time they bear date;
nor of any other circumstance which can take this claim No* 2S,
out of the statute; it must therefore be considered as barred.
The claims No. 6, 18 and 19, are founded on simple contracts,
upon which absolute judgments have been obtained against the
administrator; the claims No. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 21, 23, 24 and
26, are founded on simple contracts on which judgments have been
rendered against the administrator for a proportion of the personal
assets; and the claims No. 29 and 34, are founded on simple con-
tracts, in satisfaction of which the administrator has bound himself
by single bills to pay a proportion of assets. All these claims,
considered as the simple contract debts of the intestate are clearly
barred by the statute of limitations as against the realty; but they
are not so barred as against the personal estate by reason of those
judgments and acknowledgments.
In the voucher exhibited of claim No. 8, it is said to have been
secured by a deed of trust for a piece of ground in Georgetown;
but no such deed has been shewn to the court; and, therefore,
upon the proof, as it stands, this claim can only be regarded as a
simple contract debt; and, as such, is clearly barred by the statute
of limitations relied on against it. The claims No. 16, 17, 32 and
33, have no other foundation than that of simple contracts; and
are evidently barred by the statute of limitations relied on against
them.
The claim No. 7, is for costs on an absolute judgment which
was recovered against the administrator; and therefore, as it is a
claim which, of itself, never existed against the estate of the de-
ceased, it cannot now be made a charge upon his estate, and must
be wholly rejected. The claims No, 30 and 31, it is also clear;
because of the circumstances and for the reasons stated by the
auditor, in his report, cannot be sustained against either the per-
sonal or real estate of the deceased. They must therefore be
altogether rejected,
It is agreed, that Christiana, the widow of Benjamin Mackall,
deceased, be allowed for her dower, in the Prince Georges lands,
the sum of one thousand dollars, to be paid to her by Louis
Mackall, out of the bond given by him as a purchaser of a part of
the land. Hence, it is unnecessary to speak of the principles of
equity by which her right of dower might have been protected, and
the arrangements of the funds which might have been made for
that purpose.
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