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522 POST v. MACKALL.
ditors, whose claims have the same grade and authenticity. (j)
But as this personal property so mortgaged came to the hands of
the defendant Louis Mackall as administrator de bonis non, he must
be held accountable for it; and can only be discharged, in so far
as it may appear, that it had been applied in satisfaction of the
debt; and for so much as may not have been so applied, he alone
must be charged.
The claims No. 14, 20, 25, 27, 28 and 37, are founded on spe-
cialties, not barred by the statute of limitations. Upon claims No.
14, 20 and 28, absolute judgments have been obtained against the
administrator; and judgments for a proportion of the personal
assets on claims No, 25, 21 and 37. The claim No. 22, the
voucher of which was not filed here until the11th of January,
1831, is founded on a note under seal, which became due on the
19th of December, 1815; and, therefore, it is clearly barred, unless
it can, by some of the circumstances connected with it, be taken
out of the statute.
The execution of the deed, upon which this claim, No. 22, is
founded, has been admitted; and there are endorsed upon it seve-
ral receipts for payments, one so late as the 4th of August, 1826;
which, if shewn to be truly what they purport to be, would be suffi-
cient to take it out of the statute of limitations. A man cannot
be permitted to make evidence for himself; and the endorsements
by the obligee, such as these, are not admitted to prove the origi-
nal thing in demand; but being evidence in discharge of the obli-
gor, they are only consequentially evidence in favour of the obligee,
to take the case out of the presumption arising from the lapse of
time. Even to this extent, however, they are regarded as evidence
of a very questionable character, when it is recollected, that the
security remains in the hands of the obligee; and that he may thus
be under a continual temptation to fabricate such endorsements
merely for the purpose of sustaining his claim for the balance. But
to make such endorsements evidence for this purpose, it is neces-
gary to shew, that they were actually made, as they bear date,
within the time of limitation; for if they were made after that time,
though they may be evidence of actual payments; yet they cannot
be received as evidence to take the case out of the statute, (k)
(j) Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 384; Greenwood v. Taylor, 4 Cond. Chan.
Rep, 381. —(k) Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Will. 397; Glynn v. The Bank, 2
Ves. 42; Hillary v.. Waller, 12 Ves. 266; Fladong v. Winter, 19 Ves. 199; Serle v.
Barrington, 2 Ld, Raym. 1370; The Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108.
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