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THE BELLONA COMPANY'S CASE, 451
his property, even on a just compensation being made, but for some
public purpose. It is the public good alone which can sanction
such a compulsory alienation of the property of a citizen* The
point of this objection is, therefore, that the taking of this private
property for the construction of the proposed rail road is an appli-
cation of it to a private and not to a public use.
But the exercise of this power of the government of the state
is not confined to those cases only in which the private property
taken is to be applied immediately, directly, and exclusively to
some public use, as to the making of an open highway or the like;
for, it is enough, if it clearly appears, that the application of such
private property to the proposed new use will be attended by a
material public benefit which would not otherwise be so immediately
and effectually produced. And, therefore, if it be shewn, that such
a public good must necessarily be the result of such an application
of the private property, it is of no consequence whether the con-
demnation or compulsory alienation places it in the hands of the
state, of a corporation, or even of an individual. In all such cases
the General Assembly may justly authorize a condemnation of any
private property for such a public benefit, by such proceedings as
are proposed to be prosecuted by these defendants, (g)
It may, in some cases, be difficult, in this respect, to distinguish
between a public and a private use, and to determine how far this
exercise of the government's power of eminent domain may be
carried. But in this case I deem it sufficiently clear, that the con-
struction of a rail road, as proposed by the defendants, must result
in such a general advantage to the people as to warrant the court
in pronouncing it such a public use as affords an ample justifica-
tion of the proceeding by which the plaintiffs may be compelled to
part with their land on receiving for it a just compensation. Hence
there is no foundation for this objection of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, after taking a comparative view of the fifteenth,
sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth sections of the act by which the
defendants have been incorporated, contended that the defendants'
authority to acquire a title to land for the use of their rail road
must be confined altogether to such land as is held by individual
citizens, by mere natural persons.
But a fictitious body of citizens, formed by charter, is as a mere
citizen, as natural bodies in a state of subjection to the government
(g) Pressly's Case, ante 390, note.
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