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450 THE BELLONA COMPANY'S CASE.
to them in that capacity, and nothing more. The General Assem-
bly did not; and, it may be affirmed, could not enact, or covenant
with the plaintiffs, that the land held by them should be considered
as an estate more favoured and sacred than that of any individual
citizen of the Republic; for, as it has been said, even the parlia-
ment of England, with all its unlimited sovereignty, cannot legally
make any partial distinctions among the subjects of the realm, (f)
AH or any of the property of a citizen may be taken, upon a just
compensation being made, and applied to the use of the public;
and all property belonging, in like manner, to a corporation, must
also be held liable to the same eminent domain, or peculiar power
of the government*
The only plausible ground upon which any portion of the territory
of the Republic could be exempted from a liability to the exercise
of this power of the government of the state would be, that it had
been previously applied to some greater or equally beneficial public
use, with which the proposed new application was incompatible.
But there is no pretext for claiming an exemption, upon that or any
other principle, in favour of the land held by these plaintiffs; be-
cause it cannot, in any sense whatever, be considered as having
been appropriated to any public use; it is merely held as private
property, for the peculiar emolument of its incorporated owners,
and which they may dispose of at their pleasure. The tenure by
which they hold it forms no part of that which is of the essence of
their act of incorporation, or the alleged contract between them and
the state. There is therefore nothing in the acts incorporating the
plaintiffs, even considered as a contract, which can be so construed
as to prevent the condemnation of their land to a public use in the
manner proposed by the defendants.
The plaintiffs have urged, that the application of their land to
the purposes of the rail road proposed to be made by the defen-
dants, is not such a public use as can justify the taking of it with-
out their consent; although it should be agreed, on all hands, that
the private property of corporations as well as of individuals, might
be taken for any public purpose on a just compensation being
made for it.
Under our government the property of one man cannot be taken
without his consent, and given to another by any form of proceed-
ing; and, consequently, no citizen can be compelled to part with
(f) Kames Pri. Eq. b. 2, c. S.
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