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404 PRICE v. TYSON.
for as such; and because it would be highly inconvenient to hold
that, in answer to the common interrogatories a defendant should
be justified in loading the parties with the expense that attends
the setting forth all the minute particulars and prices in an auc-
tioneer's catalogue; since it would have been sufficient to state,
that the furniture was sold by auction at such a time and place, by
such a person, and had produced such a sum. And if a plaintiff
really desires to be furnished with these minuter details he will
have no difficulty in explaining his purpose by a special interro-
gatory. (I)
Hence it clearly appears, that a defendant, in making answer to
a bill, cannot be permitted, in any manner, to stray beyond the
confines of the case therein set forth; or to bring within those
limits any thing which can afford no degree of that information
asked for by the bill; or which can have no influence upon the
case; or which cannot be, in any way, needful to him as a defence
against the claims and pretensions of the plaintiff. Upon these
principles, in the case now under consideration, I cannot pro-
nounce the various allegations of this answer, designated by the
plaintiff as additional matter, to be entirely impertinent and foreign
from the subject in dispute.
It is admitted, that the defendants have fully and sufficiently
responded to all that has been asked of them by the bill. But the
defendants having a right to set forth the matters on which they
mean to rely as a defence against the plaintiff's claim have done
so; and it is against those positions of the answer, that all the
plaintiff's objections have been directed. These defendants, in
the suit at law, have relied upon the plea of plene admistravit;
and in their answer to this bill they do, in effect, shew how they
mean to sustain that plea. They here state, as the substance and
foundation of their defence, that they had reasonable ground to
presume, that the claim of the plaintiff had been satisfied, or aban-
doned, arising from the length of time during which the dispute
had loitered or slumbered in the court of law; from no demand
having been made upon them, after they had given notice by pub-
lication according to law, which notice had been repeatedly deli-
vered into the house of the plaintiff's testator, who had for many
years resided near these defendants and their testator; and before
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(l) Alsager v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 217; Norway v. Rowe, 1 Meriv. 347; Beaumont
v. Beaumont, 5 Mad. 51.
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