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PRICE v. TYSON. 403
have been scandalous, though immaterial; because the plaintiff
led him into it; but now he is impertinent for going out of the
way purely to reflect on the plaintiff, (j)
And where, after the defendant had answered, and the plaintiff
had amended his mere bill of discovery so as to pray relief, it was
held, that the defendant could not put in a complete answer over
again; and that if he did so, all that part of it which purported
to be an answer to any thing beyond the amended bill might be
expunged as impertinent, (k)
And where the object of the bill was to obtain an account, and
as a means of relief to have an explanation of certain bills of costs
and accounts, with the amount of which the plaintiff had been
charged, and the plaintiff, for that purpose, had propounded to the
defendant sundry very minute and particular interrogatories as to
their nature; calling upon the defendant to specify, and shew how
they were made out; and by what computation the result had
been produced; or where the object was to ascertain the amount
and the nature of the assets in the hands of an executor; and the
interrogatories propounded asked him to state the amount of the
assets which had come to his hands, with a particular account of
their nature. And the defendant annexed to his answer a large
and minute schedule of the items of his account, with a commen-
tary of his own upon each item; or had appended to his answer a
schedule which was, in fact, nothing more than a mere transcript
of tradesmen's bills; or where the defendant, the executor, having
sold the testator's household furniture by auction, set forth, in the
schedule to his answer, a copy of the auctioneer's catalogue, with
the description and price of every article.
It was held, that such schedules were altogether unnecessary
mad impertinent, notwithstanding the minute and special inquiries
of the plaintiff, and were expunged accordingly; because they
conveyed not the least degree of information upon the questions
asked by the bill, the object of which was to have the heads of
one claim and another so set out as to be informed how a particu-
lar balance bad been produced; and because, although the plain-
tiff had pertinaciously insisted on a full disclosure; and therefore,
after so insisting, could not object to the disclosure in ordinary
cases; yet the defendant could not be justified in setting out all
the items of a tradesman's bill, unless they were specifically called
(j) Smith v. Reynolds, Mosely, 70.—(k) Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 363.
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