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324 COOMBS v. JORDAN.
tive of the greatest evils, and the most mischievous consequences;
and therefore, there was but a year's time allowed to execute such
judgments, as between party and party; where however, the state
was plaintiff it might sue out execution at any time after the year
without a scire facias. But in debt, if the judgment was not exe-
cuted, the debt was presumed to be paid, when the judgment lost
its force; and therefore, the common law, in such case, gave no
scire facias but a new action, (r)
This limitation to the issuing of an execution on a judgment,
between party and party, has been repeatedly recognized by our
legislature as being founded, like all other limitations, upon a
presumption of satisfaction; and as being, on that ground, an
effectual bar to that mode of recovery; and consequently, as fur-
nishing conclusive evidence of the extinction of the lien; since,
as has been shown, there can be no lien where there is no right to
issue execution, (s)
The statute which gave the scire facias as a new mode of re-
Tiring a judgment in personal actions, (t) made no alteration as
to the time within which such judgments were to be executed;
nor has the act which declares, that on all judgments, thereafter to
tie rendered, a fieri facias may issue at any time within three
years from the date of such judgments, (u) made any other altera-
tion whatever in the existing law. And therefore if a plaintiff,
after the time allowed for suing out execution, revives his judg-
ment, its attendant lien can only operate prospectively; and not
with any retrospective effect, so as to overreach any intermediate
incumbrances or alienations; for, although, as between the parties
to the judgment when revived, it may be permitted to operate as
a lien upon the property of the defendant from its date; yet, as a
legal relation is never suffered to work a wrong, it cannot be al-
lowed to bind the property as against any intermediate encumbrancer, or bona fide purchaser, without notice, but from the date
of its revival; (w) and so too, as to deeds, to the validity of
(f) Gilb. Execu. 12, 26, 92, 95; Gilb. Court of Exchequer, 166; Anonymous, 2
Salk, 603; Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 600; Eppes v. Randolph, 2 Call. 125;
Nimmo v. The Commonwealth, 4 Hen, & Mun, 57; Coleman v. Cocke, 6 Rand.
629; Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 179; The United States v. Morrison, 4 Peters, 124.
(s) May, 1766, ch. 7; February, 1777, ch. 15, s, 7; October, 1778, ch. 21, s. 7;
Bac. Abr. tit. Limitation of Actions, E. 6.—(t) 13 Ed. 1. C. 45.—(u) 1823, ch. 194.
(w) Jacob Law Dict.v. Relation; Heapy v. Parris, 6 T, R. 368; Lord Mahon's
case, 6 Mod, 59; Anonymous, S Atk. 521; Fothergill v. Kendrick, 2 Vern. 234;
Bothomly v. Fairfax, 2 Vern. 751; S. C. 1 P. Will. 335.
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