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COOMBS v. JORDAN. 323
only attach upon real estate or an equitable interest in such an
estate subject to all prior liens or incumbrances; and that the first
Hen is, in all cases, entitled to a prior satisfaction, unless it be
intrinsically defective, (p) If the legal estate in fee in this land,
had been vested in Booth, and he had mortgaged it, the judgment
and lien of Stone & McWilliams would only, according to the
English law, have given them the right to come here and redeem
the prior mortgage; or, according to our law, to have had the land
sold, and after satisfying all prior liens to have had the residue of
the proceeds of sale applied in whole or in part satisfaction of their
claim. Here, the equitable lien held by the court for the benefit
of the creditors and heirs of the late Richard Jordan, was a prior
incumbrance which must be satisfied: and the proceeds of sale
remaining after that, represents the amount and value of that equi-
table interest in the land upon which the judgment of Stone &
McWilliams gave them a lien which followed that interest from
the land to the proceeds of sale, so as to entitle them to be paid
out of that fund in preference to any subsequent lien upon that
interest, or any other of the creditors of Jeremiah Booth, (q)
It is clear then, that the judgment of Stone & McWilliams did
give them a lien upon the equitable interest held by Jeremiah
Booth; but the circumstances of this case suggests another in-
quiry, in relation to this point, and that is, whether their lien con-
tinued to be in full force, at the time they filed their petition, so at
to overreach any intermediate claims against Booth's estate; and
to continue to them their right to a preference in satisfaction.
At common law, a man, by a judgment, authenticated his debt,
and thereby obtained authority to sue out execution within a year
and a day; but, if he failed to do so, it was presumed to be paid;
and the defendant might plead payment and a release of such
recorded debt; because all judgments were to be rendered effec-
tual within a competent time, which was the same as in case of
non-claim. This time of limitation of judgment was the same in
real as in personal actions; for though the judgment on a real
action settled the right to the land, as in the personal it did to the
thing in demand; yet that judgment could not lie dormant forever,
to be executed at any time; for then dormant judgments would
overreach conveyances between parties, which would be produc-
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(p) Powel Mortg. 435; Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat 179—(q) Davidson v. Clay-
land, 1 H. & J. 546; Jones v. Jones, 1 Bland, 451; Lewis v. Zouehe, 2 Cond. Chan.
Rep. 470,
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