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COOMBS v. JORDAN. 299
devise his land; or in any way encumber it with the payment of
hist debts; and hence a creditor who had recovered judgment
against him, could not take it in execution for the
of his debt; so that, by the feudal law, lands were entirely ex-
empted from being taken in execution, and sold for the satisfac-
tion of the debts of the holder. The feudal restrictions upon
voluntary alienations, were giving way before the general spirit of
the times, when the statute de donis repeated what the law of
tenures had before said, that the tenor of the grant should be ob-
served; and this created that pernicious species of fettered inhe-
ritances called estates tail; which have also yielded to public
utility; and have at length, in our country, been almost totally
annihilated. The right of alienation by last will and testament,
has been made absolute in almost all respects, (g)
The restrictions upon involuntary alienation by attachment of
law, have not been so entirely removed. The tenant may, in some
cases, voluntarily alien his estate where it cannot be at all, or to
a very limited extent, affected by an execution upon a judgment
against him. As in the case of a mere empty legal estate, the
trust of which is possessed by another; (h) or in the instance of
a tenant in tail, whose estate has been saved from the operation of
the act to direct descents; (t) who may, if he thinks proper, bar
the intail in the manner allowed by the act of Assembly, and
alien the estate; (j) yet if he neglects or refuses to dock the in-
tail, and have it converted into a fee simple in himself, his credi-
tor, who has obtained a judgment against him, can only take the
estate during his life, in satisfaction of his debt; and after his
death it will pass to the heir intail, entirely discharged from all the
debts and incumbrances of the last tenant intail. (k) Therefore,
although a judicial Hen can extend no farther, in any case, than
the defendant's power of alienation; yet it is not in all respects
co-extensive with it. But where the real estate is devisable by
law, no disposition can be made of it to the prejudice of creditors;
and therefore, it may be safely affirmed, that a judicial lien is, in
most respects, commensurate with the legal right of testation. (f)
(g) Taylor v Horde, 1 Burr. 115; June, 1773, ch. 1; November, 1782, ch. 23;
Newton v, Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111.—(A) Finch v. Winchelsea, 1 P. Will, 278; Forth
v. Norfolk, 4 Mad, 503.—(i) 1820, ch. 101; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 129,—
(j ) June, 1773, ch. 1; November, 1782, ch. 23.—(k) Paca v. Forwood, 2 H, & McH.
175; Ridgely v. McLaughlin, 3 H, & McH. 220; Laidler v. Young , 2 H. & J 69.—
(l) 3 and 4 W. & M. c. 14; 1 Fonb. 284; Kinaston v. Clark, 2 Atk. 204; Ham-
mond v, Gaither, S H. & McH. 218,
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