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290 COOMBS v. JORDAN.
According to the law of England, a judgment of a court of
common law operates as a general lien upon all the real estate of
the defendant, which may be taken in execution and sold, or deli-
vered under an elegit, or extended by a statute merchant or statute
staple for the satisfaction of such judgment or recognizance. This
lien is not the result of any principle of the common law applica-
ble indiscriminately to all judgments in favour of a creditor; but
arises out of the liability of the real estate to be taken in execu-
tion and sold at the common law, or out of the statutes that give
the elegit, and recognizances called statute merchant and statute
Staple, by virtue of which the lands of the debtor were generally
made liable to be sold, delivered, or extended; (d) and although
only a moiety of the land could be taken under an elegit; yet the
lieu is general and comprehends all the lands held by the debtor,
as well those which he had at the time of entering up the judg-
ment as those which he may have subsequently acquired. And
this lien fastens upon the real estate on the day the judgment is
rendered, (e) This judgment lien is a uniform consequence of the
real estate being liable to be taken and extended under an execu-
tion issuing upon such judgment. Wherever then such a liability
exists, the lien arises as the constant incident of such a judgment;
and where the property cannot be taken in execution, there is no
lien. It will, therefore, be sufficient in this, or any similar case,
to shew the liability of the real estate to be so taken in execution,
to establish the existence of the lien, (f)
The lien upon a real estate, which is incident to a judgment
aghast its owner, extends no further than to cover the whole of
that right which he himself might have voluntarily transferred to
his creditor in satisfaction of his debt; its operation is always
limited by the extent of the debtor's power of alienation. The
alienation of lands is either voluntary, as by deed inter vivos, or
by last will and testament; or it is involuntary as by attachment
of law.
During the existence of the feudal system, all kinds of aliena-
tion by the feudatory were prohibited, because of their being con-
trary to the tenor of the grant The tenant could not will or
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