ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 657

mal and summary, (o) The vendor under a decree, therefore, holds
two securities for the payment of the purchase money; one is this
equitable lien, and the other is the personal liability of the purcha-
ser. It is conceded on all hands, that the equitable lien may be
enforced in a summary way. Can there then, be any conceivable
solid reason, why the personal liability should not also be enforced
in a summary way ? If it could not, there would be a gross incon-
gruity in the rules of the court. But it is not so; the personal
liability may be enforced in a summary way, and there is a perfect
harmony in the rules and principles of the court.

Upon the whole, it is my opinion, that the purchase money of
property sold under a decree, after the sale has been ratified, may
be recovered either by an order and process of attachment of con-
tempt against the purchaser himself, to compel him to complete his
purchase after the purchase money has become due; or by a re-sale
of the property, grounded on the subsisting equitable lien; or by
an action at law against the purchaser and his sureties, upon the
bonds or notes given by them for the payment of the purchase
money.

Ordered, that no good cause having been shewn against the
order of the 17th of March last, the same is hereby confirmed and
made absolute. Also Ordered, that an attachment issue against
the said Samuel Anderson, to enforce obedience to the said order,
returnable to the next term.

From this order Anderson having appealed, a transcript of the
record was sent up accordingly, and the case was argued before
the Court of Appeals by the solicitors of the parties, (p)

June term, 1828.—By the Court of Appeals.—It appears from
the proceedings in this case, that on the sale made by the appellee
to the appellant, being reported to the Chancellor, objections to its
ratification were filed by the appellant, and answered by the appellee,
on full consideration of which, the sale was ratified, and that ratifi-
cation affirmed by this court; it is, therefore, not competent for the
appellant now to contest the propriety or validity of that sale, it
having received the sanction of the highest judicial authority of this
state. But it has been contended, that as the appellant never was

(o) Haig v. Commissioners of Confiscated Estates, 1 Desau. 144.—(p) This opi-
nion of the Court of Appeals is introduced here, out of chronological order, that it may
be placed in juxta-position to the decision of the Chancellor, to which it relates.