656 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.

They are considered as two assurances, each affording a remedy,

or mode of obtaining one satisfaction, (i) So also, a receiver

appointed by the Court of Chancery, is always required to give

bond, with surety, to account. But in such case, the court may

either proceed by attachment against the receiver alone, or upon

the bond, (j )

In all these, and other like cases, the existence of the two secu-
rities, being perfectly compatible, the one with the other, it has
never been held, that the taking of one amounts to a tacit waiver
of the other, (k) And consequently, the taking of bonds or notes
with or without surety, of a purchaser under a decree, cannot, in
any case, be construed as an abandonment of the right to proceed
against the purchaser alone by attachment, to enforce the payment
of the purchase money, after it has become due, and after the sale
has been ratified.

But if the parties choose, as they may, to have the bonds or notes
which have been taken of the purchaser, assigned to them in satis-
faction of their claims, that have been established; (l) or to have
the trustee directed to proceed against the purchaser and his sure-
ties, in order to fix their liability by a judgment at law, and in that
way to recover the purchase money, suits may be brought upon the
bonds or notes by the assignee or the trustee, according to the uni-
form and long established course, where such has been the choice
and object of the parties, (m)

It is a clear and well settled principle of this court, that where
property has been sold under its decree, the court, as the vendor
for the benefit of those interested, retains an equitable lien for the
payment of the purchase money, (n) The most usual way of
enforcing this lien, has been by petition of a party interested, set-
ting forth the facts, and praying that the property may be re-sold
to pay the whole or the balance of the purchase money. And a
sale may be ordered accordingly, at the risk of the delinquent pur-
chaser. The proceedings, in such cases, are almost always infor-

(t) The United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, 482.—(j) Da vies v. Cracraft, 14 Ves.
143; Musgrave v. Medex, 1 Meriv. 49; Utten v. Utten, 1 Meriv. 51.—(k) Wright
v. Freeman, 5 H. & J. 475; The Mayor of Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J. 394.—
(I) Spurrier v. Spurrier, 1 Bland, 476, note; Ex parte Boone, ante 321, note;
McMullen v. Burris, ante 357, note; Christie v. Hammond, ante 645, note; 1785,
ch. 72, s. 9.—(m) Collmridge v. Mount, 2 Dick. 688; Musgrave v. Medex, 1
Meriv. 49.—(n) Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Cowell v. Simpson, 16
Vei. 276.