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ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 653

Court of Appeals. The contract between this court and this pur-
chaser is, therefore, now absolute, complete, and of record.

But now, in answer to an order calling on him to pay the pur-
chase money, he says, that relief, or the means of forcing him to
pay can only be obtained by bill in equity, or a suit at law. A
bill in equity in this court would only be going over the same
ground, that has already been gone over. It would be idle repe-
tition, an unnecessary and improper proceeding; and, therefore,
cannot be allowed. This purchaser stands charged by the record
and proceedings, now here, as the debtor of this court, for the
benefit of its suitors, to a certain amount upon a judicial sale and
contract, which has been duly investigated, and absolutely ratified
and confirmed.

It is said, however, that a suit at law must be brought upon this
contract. By whom must it be brought? Was a suit at law,
grounded merely upon an order in chancery, ratifying a sale made
under a decree, ever before heard of ? Lord Hardwicke, as we
have seen, has expressly declared, that there can be no remedy
at law where all the contract arises out of the acts of the court
amounting to a decree. But this court is to be regarded as the
vendor; and as no bond or note has been taken from this pur-
chaser, which could enable the parties interested to put their claim
against him into the common law form of an action at law, how,
or in what manner, is such an action to be brought ? Must they
bring an action of debt, of assumpsit, or a special action on
the case?

In all cases of this sort, where property has been sold under a
decree to pay debts, or for other purposes, and no bonds or notes
have been taken, there seems to be an insuperable difficulty in
making proper parties to try the right at law to the whole purchase
money, or to any dividend of it, either as against the purchaser, or
any one or more of the litigating parties to the suit in equity.
The powers of the trustee, if he takes no bonds or notes, cease
with the ratification of the sale, as to all the purposes of a suit at
law. The decree clothes him with no power to sue at law; and
if it did, or this court were specially to direct him to sue, it must
put into his hands the cause of action, the evidence of the debt,
with its own order. The action must then be grounded upon an
order of this court, and instituted in the name of its agent. It
would be as if one court were to bring suit upon its own judg-
83 v.2