652 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.

ground to set aside a sale ;' yet, considering the circumstances of
that case, the sale was annulled, and the bonds cancelled as
prayed, (c) In this respect, there are but two modes of proceed-
ing in chancery, the regular and the summary way. The other
way of which the Chancellor speaks, in this regular case by bill,
must, therefore, be understood to mean the summary way by peti-
tion, for process of attachment against the purchaser, or for a re-
sale, grounded on the equitable lien; which latter, must have been
that other way, particularly alluded to. For, he certainly could not
have referred to an action at common law, on the bond against this
bankrupt purchaser, and his insolvent surety.

In the year 1821, a case occurred in this court, in which the
party interested, applied for, and actually obtained relief, in that
other way, alluded to, as it is believed, by the Chancellor, in his
decree of 1808. After the ratification of the sale, the purchaser
had neglected and refused to pay the purchase money. Upon a
petition of the trustee, representing the fact, the court passed an
order commanding the purchaser to pay by an appointed day, or
shew cause, or on default, an attachment would be ordered. The
party made default, and an attachment was ordered. After which,
the money was paid, (d)

The defence of this purchaser, in this case, is that the parties
can only obtain redress by bill in equity or a suit at law. He has
already, by petition, prayed relief of this court; and after having
obtained its decision in that form, and had that decision submitted
to the revision of the court in the last resort, it surely ought not to
be expected, that these tribunals would again consider and adju-
dicate upon that cause of controversy, if presented in a new shape,
and merely put into the form of a suit by bill. The jurisdiction of
this court over this matter was as extensively and beneficially ex-
ercised, on its being presented by petition, as it could have been
in any other way; and the mode by petition is certainly the most
usual and proper, if not the only one in which it ought to have
been presented. Every objection which this purchaser ehose to
make; and, no doubt, every one which he thought could be made,
with any degree of plausibility, against the ratification of this sale,
has been made, fully and maturely investigated, considered and
decided upon here; and that judgment has been affirmed by the

(e) Simpson v. Hammond, per Kilty, Chancellor.—(d) Bolte v. Biays, 15th
March, 1821, per Kilty, Chancellor.