WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON. 517

ence to this subject, in an order passed on the 20th of March,
1800, he says, 'there is no proof relative to the circumstances of
George Garnet, or the two other securities, William Clayton and
Nathan Wright. When claims are exhibited against an infant's
estate, and it appears that the debt was due from the deceased
and another, or others jointly, it has been the Chancellor's uni-
form practice to allow only the just proportion to come out of the
infant's estate. The practice is founded on this consideration,
that, on an application by creditors, for the sale of an infant's es-
tate, it is a matter of sound discretion, whether or not the Chan-
cellor will decree a sale. He is governed by circumstances. In
case of a debt due from the ancestor or devisor jointly with another
who is solvent, the Chancellor might say I will not decree a sale,
or I will not suffer you to receive your debt from the infant's estate,
because you have it in your power, or had it in your power, since
the ancestor's or devisor's death, to recover your whole claim from
the other debtor. But the Chancellor conceived, that to avoid
circuity of action, and do justice to all, it was proper to charge the
infant only his just proportion; or to admit the claim against the
estate for only a just proportion, Were Garnet, William Clayton,
and Nathan Wright all insolvent? Was one of them solvent, and
the others not? Have any steps been taken to recover from them?
It is certain, perhaps, that they are now protected by the act of
limitations; but is this a reason wherefore Clayton's estate is to be
charged with the whole?' (d)

During the whole time of Chancellor Kilty, these principles
appear to have been continually recognized as the settled law of
the court; and in one case of a creditor's suit, where he himself
was the originally suing creditor, he evidently acquiesced under
them, although they were opposed to his own interest; and asked
a decision from the judge, to whom his case was necessarily sub-
mitted, founded upon their admitted correctness and established
authority, (e) But although they appear to have been so repeat-
edly recognized by Chancellor Kilty, yet I have met with no case,
in which he has given any reasons by which he had conceived
they might be sustained.

Chancellor Johnson, in an order passed on the 10th of April,
1822, in a creditor's suit, addressing himself immediately to this
subject, says, 'the complainants except to that part of the auditor's

(d) Hindman v. Clayton, ante 341.—(e) Kilty v. Brown, ante 222.
66 v.2