516 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.

tors of the parties were fully heard, and the proceedings read
and considered.

The general principles, referred to by the auditor, as the founda-
tion of his objections to the several claims for which the deceased
became liable only as an endorser, are these: That wherever it
appears,, from the voucher filed by a creditor as evidence of his
claim, that the deceased was in any way jointly liable with others,
the creditor must shew whether or not the deceased was equally
bound as a co-debtor, or as principal, or surety, or whether he was
bound with others as a co-surety. If he was bound as principal
debtor, then the creditor is allowed to come in for the whole amount
of his claim. But if the deceased was only bound as one of two
or more principal debtors, then the creditor must shew that the
other principal debtors are insolvent, or he will not be allowed to
come in for the proportion which such other principal debtor might
have been made to pay. If the deceased was only a surety, then the
creditor must shew that the principal is insolvent, or he will be ex-
cluded altogether. And if the deceased was one of several sureties,
then the creditor must not only shew that the principal is unable to
pay, but that the other sureties are insolvent, or he will not be
allowed to claim more than the equitable proportion for which the
deceased was liable. If these facts and circumstances do not neces-
sarily or sufficiently appear from the vouchers, filed as the founda-
tion of the claim, then the burthen of explanation and proof is
thrown upon the creditors, and that, too, by the ex officio act of the
court, without any suggestions or objection to that effect being
made by any other creditor or party in the case.

When I came here I found that these principles had been con-
sidered as long settled; but I have never been able to persuade
myself to approve of them; and now, after some years of obser-
vation, I am satisfied that they occasion much embarrassment and
delay in the administration of the real assets of deceased debtors;
and oftener than otherwise result in absolute wrong and injustice
to creditors against whom not the slightest misconduct can, in any
manner, be imputed. I shall, therefore, as their correctness and
true application have been called in question by these excepting
creditors, take this occasion to examine the reasons and grounds
upon which they have been rested.

It would seem that these principles, in relation to the adminis-
tration of the real assets of deceased debtors, had been first
introduced in the time of Chancellor Hanson. Speaking in refer-