MURDOCK'S CASE. 463

passive of his violent character and intemperate passions; that no
commission had been issued, nor any proofs taken. She, there-
fore prayed leave to amend her answer in this particular.

18th August, 1825.—BLAND, Chancellor.—It appears that the
defendant has thought proper to correct her defence as regards
the character of her deceased husband. Giving his character in
her answer, she has used the word intemperate, from which it may
be inferred that he was either excessive in meat and drink, or that
he was passionate and ungovernable. The word intemperate, ac-
cording to the most approved authorities, conveys both of those
meanings. The defendant now alleges, by her petition, that the
latter was the sense in which she intended to use the word. There-
fore, it is Ordered, that the defendant be, and she is hereby per-
mitted to file a supplemental answer, correcting the mistake, as
prayed; leaving to the parties the effect of what was originally
sworn with the explanation of the supplemental answer, (a)

After which, the plaintiff put in his general replication, commis-
sions were issued, and testimony taken and returned.

2d October, 1826.—BLAND, Chancellor.—This case standing
ready for hearing, the counsel on both sides were fully heard, and
the proceedings read and considered. It very satisfactorily ap-
pears, from the proofs, that the contracts relied on by the plaintiff
in his bill, were deliberately and fairly made and entered into in
all respects whatever. And it also appears, that the plaintiff is
now fully able to convey to the representatives of the late Gilbert
Murdoch, senior, a good and sufficient title to the property sold to
him according to the terms of the contract between them.

With regard to the allegation of the defendant, that the plaintiff
had previously brought another suit for the same cause, which suit
was then depending, it will be sufficient to observe, that on ad-
verting to the bill referred to, which was filed on the 15th of
January, 1825, it appears upon the face of it, that it can only be
considered as an injunction bill to stay waste; the prayer for a sale
being utterly incompatible with its statement, must, necessarily, be
regarded as mere surplusage. And, rejecting the prayer for a sale,
it cannot, in any way whatever, be considered as a bill for a sale,
or to foreclose a mortgage, which is the sole object of this suit.

(a) Curling v. Townshend, 19 Ves. 630; Livesey v. Wilson, 1 Ves. & Bea. 149 ;
Strange ». Colling, 2 Ves. & Bea. 163 j Edwards v. McLeary, 2 Ves. & Bea. 256.