462 MURDOCK'S CASE.

and interest, and for general relief. An injunction was granted as
prayed. The defendant, by her answer, admitted the cutting and carrying
away of timber, as charged, but averred that the land would, not-
withstanding, be more than sufficient to pay the debt; and as to
the prayer for a sale, she relied on the fact that no part of the debt
was due at the time the bill was filed.

Upon hearing of the motion to dissolve, on the 11th of October,
1825, the injunction was continued to the final hearing or further
order.

On the 1st of March, 1825, this plaintiff filed another bill against
this defendant, in which he stated the facts in relation to the mort-
gage as in the before-mentioned bill; and that the mortgaged land
was the property of the defendant, whose husband was dead in-
testate, and that she had been appointed administratrix of his
personal estate, including his chattels real; that on the non-pay-
ment of the mortgage when due, the defendant was to have a lot
of ground in the city of Annapolis sold, and the proceeds applied
in satisfaction of the debt, which had not been done; and that the
whole mortgage debt, with one year's interest, was then due, upon
which he prayed a sale, &c. In this bill there was no allusion to
that filed on the 15th of January, 1825.

On the 9th of July, 1825, the defendant put in her answer, in
which she admitted the execution of the mortgage; but averred
that it had been obtained from her husband, who was an illiterate
and, unhappily, an intemperate man, by great importunity and
undue influence; that there were certain conditions and stipula-
tions in relation to certain lots purchased from the plaintiff by her
late husband, and which lots formed the consideration for which
the mortgage had been given, which had not been complied with;
that the plaintiff having no title to those lots, the consideration of
the mortgage had therefore failed; and that the plaintiff had, on
the 15th of January, 1825, filed his bill, praying a sale of the
mortgaged property, which was then depending, and therefore she
relied on the pendency of that suit as a bar to this.

The defendant, by her petition on oath, stated, that by a mistake
and misapprehension, she had, in speaking of the character of her
late husband in her answer, said that he was an intemperate man;
since which, it had occurred to her, that the expression might be
construed to import the excessive use of spirituous liquor, which
was not her meaning; but that what she said was meant to be ex-